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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
This paper looks at the way the European Union deals with cases of democratic backsliding 
among its Member States and the underlying reasons for the different handling of the different 
countries cases. The Member States that will be looked at are Austria, Romania and Hungary. 
The first country is characterised by having a right-wing populist party in government. 
Romania is a case in which the government made excessive use of emergency decrees and 
Hungary is still being governed by a government which undermines democratic checks and 
balances. In order to get a better understanding of the different reaction of the EU towards 
each case, social constructivist and rational choice theories will be used. This paper highlights 
that the EU has learned from the case of Austria and has improved the legal tools of Article 7 
in order to deal with future cases. Yet, even if circumstances are suited for the application of 
sanctioning mechanisms, such as Article 7, the successful outcome also depends on the 
goodwill of veto players and the willingness of the European Institutions to use these tools. 
Another way for the EU, if possible, is to use the legal relationship that exists between the EU 
and the accused Member State, thus linking the improvement of democratic backsliding with 
material incentives.     
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1 Introduction   
 
 
In July 2014 the Vice-President of the European Commission Neelie Kroes, expressed her 
concerns about the present violation of media freedom in the European Member State (MS) 
Hungary. In her views, the present situation is alarming because the “…Hungarian 
Government does not want a neutral, foreign-owned broadcaster in Hungary; it is using an 
unfair tax to wipe out democratic safeguards, and see off a perceived challenge to its power.”1 
The Vice-President refers in her statement to the latest developments happening in Hungary. 
In June 2014 the Hungarian Government implemented a new law in which the countries last 
free public TV station had a huge tax increase on their revenue from advertisement (40% 
extra). This tax increase is seen as a further step by the government in Hungary to push back 
media freedom because it reduces the income of this TV station and therefore threaten its 
existence.2     
In her statement, Kroes continues to mention the findings of the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This organization came to the conclusion, that 
the elections in April 2014 on one hand were well conducted and offered the electorate a 
varied choice of candidates. However, on the other hand the Organization criticized that the 
present governing party (Fidesz) has a benefit in the elections due to “…restrictive campaign 
regulations, biased media coverage and campaign activities that blurred the separation 
between political party and the State.3 Kroels further mentions that “A free and plural media 
is the foundation of a free society, and a safeguard of democratic tradition. The new 
"advertising tax" in Hungary shows it is still very much under threat.”4  Both, the Vice-
President and the OSCE, expressed their concern about the latest undemocratic developments 
in Hungary.  
The just above mentioned is just a further example of a series of undemocratic changes 
which have been implemented by the present Hungarian Government. Since the election of 
the present government (in 2010), there have been many reports, from the side of the EU, the 
media and NGOs criticizing the undemocratic development in Hungary. Criticism dates back 
to 2011, in which Kroels expressed her concern regarding the newly implemented media law 
in Hungary.5 Furthermore, she criticised unbalanced media coverage (which is in breach with 
                                                 
1 European Commission, Neelie Kroes (2014)   
2 Euractive.com (2014) “Fixing Europe’s Orbán problem”; Financial Times (2014); Der Spiegel (2014);  
3 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2014)  
4 European Commission, Neelie Kroes (2014)   
5 European Commission (2014), CV Kroes  
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the EU´s Charter of Fundamental Rights) and the illegal fines. However, within the last four 
years, there have been further cases in which Hungary continued to violate basic EU laws and 
continued to be in conflict with the EU.  
 
1.1 The broader relevance of this paper 
 
With regards to other MS, it is interesting to analyse how the EU deals with the case of 
Hungary. Besides Hungary, there have also been other conflicts with MS regarding the 
violation of basic EU law. This paper will also look at the cases of Austria and Romania. In 
the year 2000, the EU threatened to sanction Austria. In this case, a right wing populist party 
(the FPÖ- Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs/ Freedom Party of Austria) whose members have 
openly expressed racist statements became part of the government.6 In contrast to the present 
case of Hungary the conflict with Austria could be resolved.  
  Finally it is also interesting to look at the case of Romania (2012). Here the new 
government implemented a set of emergency decrees thereby undermining the rule of law and 
weakening the powers of the constitutional court. This form of democratic backsliding was 
due to a conflict between the Prime Minister and the Romanian President. Similar to Austria, 
it was possible to for the European Union to find a solution and to solve the case.  
 
Besides the just mentioned cases, the issue of European MS, which are not fully in line with 
basic EU values (such as democracy, freedom of speech etc.) is also interesting when looking 
towards other MS of the 2004, 2007 or 2014 Enlargement. Similar to Hungary, most of the 
new MS have formerly had undemocratic governments and therefore have a rather young 
democratic tradition today. In addition, the democratic backsliding of Hungary can negatively 
influence EU´s possible future enlargements. Candidate countries such as Serbia and 
Montenegro do not have a democratic history.7 The present democratic deficits within 
Hungary could frighten the possible new MS and also spread uncertainty among the old (28) 
MS. It is one of the founding values of the EU, to respect and maintain “…human dignity, 
liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights 
of persons belonging to minorities.”8  Moreover, the scholar Bugarič  ,adds in his discussion 
paper the important aspect of the future of European Integration. The lack of sanctioning an 
undemocratic MS has negative consequences regarding the trust in Europe’s fundamental 
                                                 
6 The European Institute (2000)   
7 BBC (2014)  
8 European Union (2014) Uniting Europe Step by Step  
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values and negatively affects trust towards the functioning of the Unions institutions.9 Since 
the MS´ institutions are a main body of the European construct, it is their task to implement 
the EU´s regulations and directives. Therefore, “… the daily life of European citizens heavily 
depends on the faithful execution of regulations, directives and other European rules by 
national administrations and other institutions.”10 Besides the European Citizens, this lack of 
mistrust could also affect other European MS´ and affect their trust towards the Institutions. 
This mistrust could further increase the already high Euroscepticism , especially in already 
eurosceptic countries such as the United Kingdom.11 For this reason, this paper´s Research 
Question is:   
 
1.2 The papers research focus   
 
Research Question: Why does the EU respond in different ways to different forms of 
democratic backsliding? 
 
Approach: Examination of the European Union’s effort to deal with democratic backsliding 
at the example of Austria, Romania and Hungary 
 
The Research Question is answered by examining in more detail following hypotheses: 
 
1) The EU is able to learn from previous cases of democratic backsliding  
2) There are different configurations of veto players for different cases  
3) The legal relationship between the EU and each of the analysed Member States 
(Austria, Romania and Hungary) is different and this difference affects the response of 
the EU towards each case. 
The Methods and Empirics section will present how these hypotheses have been. In brief, 
after having looked at the differences between the cases of Austria, Romania and Hungary 
(which will be shown in the empirics section), five different hypotheses emerged. Besides the 
three above mentioned hypotheses, the other two are:   
4) The form/level of democratic backsliding affects the way in which the EU can respond. 
5) With regards to each case, the EU has had different tools available in order to tackle 
democratic backsliding and the use of the various tools affects the response from the 
EU towards each case.  
 
                                                 
9 Bugarič  (2004) p. 23f  
10 Ibid. p. 24 
11 The Telegraph (2014); New Statesman (2013); Foreign Affairs (2014)  
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It is this papers academic contribution, to generate the five different hypotheses, as has been 
shown above, and to test them later in the Analysis section. The first three hypotheses are the 
most relevant ones and will be discussed in the Analysis section. Hypotheses four and five are 
already partly discussed in academic literature. Therefore, focus is given to the most relevant 
hypotheses in order to answer the RQ. To get a better understanding of the independent 
variables (= the different cases of democratic backsliding), the five hypotheses have been 
developed. The hypotheses are also important in order to explain the variation on the 
dependent variable (= The European Union’s response to each case).   
 
 
Short chapter overview: 
Chapter 2: This chapter is going to present the three different country cases in a chronological 
way and how the EU responded to each case. At the end, the findings from comparing the 
three cases will be presented.  
 
Chapter 3: This chapter presents necessary background information in order to be able to get a 
better understanding of the tools the European Union has against democratic backsliding. 
 
Chapter 4: The methodological aspects will be presented in this chapter. Besides the choice of 
cases and the nature of this research paper, it will also be presented how the Research 
Question will be examined. 
 
Chapter 5: Here the theoretical foundations will be highlighted. In order to be able to answer 
the Research Question, the theoretical concepts of rational choice and social constructivism 
will be presented.   
 
Chapter 6: In the analysis chapter, the empirical material will be examined with regards to 
each of the three research hypotheses.  
 
Chapter 7: Here the findings of the Analysis chapter will be examined and evaluated. Finally, 
an answer to the Research Question will be given in this chapter as well. In the following 
afterthoughts section, the findings of the research paper will be further discussed and 
evaluated. Besides this, possible future research topics will be presented as well.  
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2 Empirics  
 
 
This background chapter will briefly present the three chosen research cases. To begin with, 
this chapter will start with a presentation of the conflict between Austria and the European 
Union. Thereafter the conflict between the EU and Romania will be presented as well, 
followed by an overview of the present case of Hungary. Each case will be presented in a 
chronological way, including the reaction of the EU towards the accused MS. The end of this 
chapter will present the differences between each case and the different response of the EU 
towards each case. As a result of this work, five different hypotheses will be presented which 
will be further elaborated in the Methods section. These hypotheses (which can be seen as the 
independent variable) will be confronted with three dependent variables (= country cases).  
 
2.1 Austria 
 
Until the year 1999 Austria had been governed by its Social Democratic Party, which was 
either alone in government or shared its power in a collation. On October 3rd, 1999 
parliamentary elections were held in Austria. In this election the Austrian Freedom Party 
(Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs/ FPÖ) had a huge increase of their votes and was second, 
after the Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Osterreichs/SPÖ). At the third 
position was the Austrian Peoples Party (Österreichische Volkspartei/ÖVP). 
 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs SPÖ 1.532.448 33,15% 65 Mandates 
Österreichische Volkspartei ÖVP 1.243.672 26,91% 52 Mandates 
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs FPÖ 1.244.087 26,91% 52 Mandates  
12 
The SPÖ tried to get into governmental negotiations with the ÖVP, but their attempts to form 
a government did not meet with success. Therefore, on the 25th of January 2000, government 
negotiations began between the ÖVP and the FPÖ. On February, 5th the government was 
approved by the Austrian President Klestil. He asked both parties to respect and follow 
democracy and human rights.13   
 
                                                 
12 Austria- Bundesministerium für Inneres   
13 Happold (2000) p. 954 
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The problematic issue with having the FPÖ in government was that this party has been often 
accused of expressing right-populist and anti-immigration ideas. The leader of the FPÖ, Jörg 
Haider has often been under criticism for his xenophobic statements. For example, he labelled 
Nazi concentration camps as “punishment centres” and was complementary about Hitlers 
employment policies. In addition, similar to other party colleagues referred to former Waffen 
SS Soldiers as “decent men of character”.14 However, he was not part of the then present 
government. The party’s political orientation was problematic for the other 14 EU MS. When 
the party was founded in 1949, it was targeted towards accommodating the needs of former 
soldiers and former Nazis.15 Nevertheless, it is wrong to say that this party is a purely neo-
fascistic and extremist party.16 The FPÖ can best be described as a “right wing populist part 
with extremist expressions.”17 These events led to widespread criticism, both at the EU level 
and internationally. The United States and Israel expressed their concerns.18  
 
Given the fact that such a party would be part of a MS´s government alarmed the other 14 
MS. The Portuguese Council Presidency stated, that “…the governments of the fourteen 
Member States will not promote or accept any official bilateral contacts at political level with 
an Austrian government integrating the FPÖ; there will be no support for Austrian candidates 
seeking positions in international organizations; Austrian Ambassadors in EU capitals will 
only be received at a technical level.”19 It was feared back then by the 14 other MS, that the 
new Austrian government might violate Article 6.1 of the Amsterdam Treaty which states a 
founding principle of the EU, namely the respect for democracy, freedom, human right, rule 
of law and basic human rights.20 As a consequence of this the Presidency of the Council 
adopted three sanctions against Austria:  
 
1) No bilateral contact between the 14 MS and Austria 
2) The 14 MS would not give any support to Austrian politicians who would try to get a 
position in international organizations 
3) Contact to Austrian ambassadors would be kept to a minimal level  
                                                 
14 Happold (2000) p. 955 
15 Luther (2000) p. 427 
16 Ibid. p. 439 
17 Duxbury (2000) p. 2  
18 Happold (2000) p. 956 
19 Falkner (2001) p. 2 
20 Crismart (2001) p. 1 
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These sanctions upset the government in Vienna, which saw it as violation of fundamental 
European laws.21 In relation to this, between the European Commission and also within the 14 
MS, there has not always been full consent of how to handle this situation. As per Happold it 
seems that the president of the Commission (Romano Prodi) at first had not been informed by 
the MS. Only shortly before the MS announced their statement, the Commission was 
informed. The Commission continued with its day to day work relating to Austria and did not 
change any of its previous working-relationship towards Austria. However, Prodi mentioned 
at the 2nd of February that the Commission “…will bear down heavily on even the slightest 
breach of the rights of individuals, or of any minority" by the Austrian government.”22Prodis 
statement was backed up by Chris Patten (external affairs Commissioner) who at first referred 
to the fascistic and undemocratic past of Europe. He also confirmed that the EU is founded on 
the rule of law and is based on the founding treaties. The Commission will in this time stand 
as the protector of the European legal foundations.23 
 
2.1.1 The report of the “three wise men” 
 
It was decided by the 14 MS that the sanctions would only apply bilaterally, but Austria 
would not be excluded from day to day EU policy and decision making. However, there were 
different views within the MS. Some MS favoured excluding Austria from EU decision 
making but the Portuguese Council Presidency decided to maintain the status quo at the EU 
level.24 During the time of the Portuguese Presidency, there has been a further dispute among 
the 14 MS of how to continue with the situation. Some states, like Belgium and France 
wanted to continue with the sanctions, while other MS such as Ireland, Italy or Denmark were 
proposing to end the sanctions. Austria, in addition, was getting more and more aware of the 
fact that if nothing would change before the end of the Portuguese Presidency that the status 
quo would remain. The then President Chirac already indicated his position.  
As a consequence of this, the Austrian government spoke out a warning, that the 
present EU-14 MS sanctions would block constitutional reform and the further accession of 
new Member States.25 In addition, the government in Vienna did not ratify a new directive 
regarding taxation on savings due to “constitutional reasons.”26 
                                                 
21 Duxbury (2000) p. 3 
22 Happold (2000) p. 956 
23 Ibid. p. 957 
24 Ibid. p. 957 
25 Happold (2000) p. 957 
26 European Council (2000) „Presidency Conclusions – Santa Maria da Feira European Council; The Guardian  
(2000)     
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Moreover, by end of June most of the MS issued their concern, that if the present sanctions 
would remain, these might not be useful to improve the situation. In addition, Denmark also 
indicated that there might be a chance that it will not ratify the introduction of the Euro later 
that year if there is no improvement in the present situation.27 Also, in a European Parliament 
resolution of June 2000 the Council was asked “…evaluate relations between the fourteen 
Member States and Austria and to work out a process with all those involved in the EU 
leading to an acceptable solution.”28 Then on 29th of June, the Portuguese Presidency came up 
with the idea of setting up a committee of three “wise men” in order to monitor Austria´s 
conformity with the present EU law.29 The president of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) was given the task to select these wise men. He chose:  
 
- Martti Ahtisaari (who used to be president of Finland earlier)  
- Jochen Frowein (director the Max Planck Institute for Foreign Public Law and 
International Law in Heidelberg; previously vice president of the European 
Commission for Human Rights) 
- Marcelino Oreja (former Spanish foreign minister; former secretary-general of the 
Council of Europe; former member of the European Commission) 
 
It was their task to explore: 
 1) “…the Austrian Government’s obligations on common European values, in particular in 
regard to the rights of minorities, refugees and immigrants, “ 
2) “…the development of the political nature of the FPÖ.” 30 
According to their findings the 14 MS will re-consider their present relationship with Austria 
and if necessary will change their behaviour.  
 
In July 2000, the Austrian federal chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel (member of the conservative 
FPÖ) mentioned that he intends to hold a referendum in Austria, in which he will ask the 
voters if Austria should do everything so that the sanctions from the EU against Austria stop 
as soon as possible. With this referendum, Schüssel expressed his dissatisfaction against the 
European measures.31  
 
                                                 
27 Prof. Dr. Dr. Dr. Hummer (2000) p. 3f 
28 Ibid p. 3 
29 Happold (2000) p. 958 
30 Prof. Dr. Dr. Dr. Hummer (2000) p. 4 
31 Der Spiegel (2000)  
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2.1.2 Conclusion of the report  
 
In their report, which the “Three Wise Men” published on the 8th of Sep. 2000, after having 
had meetings with members of the government and with other NGOs in Austria, they came to 
a positive conclusion. The report highlights that Austria is doing well in terms of Human 
Rights ratification and the implementation of these obligations. The three men even highlight 
that Austria outperforms other MS in these aspects. It is part of Austria’s constitution to 
respect and ensure the integration and protection of minorities.32 Besides a few minor issues 
(e.g. housing for asylum seekers), the overall legal framework is similar to other EU-MS. 
Paragraph 29 of the report even praised the protection and support of minorities, which 
outmatch that of most other EU-MS.33 The concluding remarks regarding the first main issue, 
the fight against racism and discrimination of immigrants also comes to a very positive 
conclusion towards the actions of the present Austrian government.34  
  With regards to the second aspect, i.e. the nature of the FPÖ, the report could not find 
any aspects that needed to be mentioned. However, the FPÖ can still be seen as a right-wing 
populist party and still needs to prove itself.35 The report finally concluded that the measures 
against Vienna should be lifted because these measures create nationalistic feelings in Austria. 
Furthermore, the wise men suggest implementing defensive and monitoring provisions into 
the TEU article 7, in order to keep an eye on the actions of the MS. In order to achieve this, 
the report suggests setting up institutional measures.36 As a result of the report, the EU14 
dropped their sanctions against Austria at the 12th of September in the same year.  
 
 
2.2 Romania  
 
In 2007, Romania together with Bulgaria joined the EU. Accession negotiation between 
Romania (and Bulgaria) had taken place, in the previous years. After EP and the Commission 
gave their approval, the accession treaties were signed in 2005. However, with regards to the 
case of Romania, there were also reasons to be mistrustful about whether Romania would 
fulfil all the requirements by January 2007. As per Article 39 of the Accession Treaty, there 
was the possibility that the accession towards Romania could be postponed by one year if the 
                                                 
32 Duxbury (2000) p. 4 
33 Bericht der Weisen (2000) p. 14 
34 Ibid. p. 19 
35 Ibid. p. 31 
36 Ibid. p. 33 
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Commission had serious concerns about Romania’s readiness to join the EU.37 The 
Commissions monitoring report (2005) already mentions that for instance that the judicial 
sector need to increase in efficiency.38   
Already in 2007, there had been a minor constitutional crisis, in which the parliament 
suspended the then president Basescu regarding the abuse of powers. This case was settled 
without the EU intervening.39 The case of 2012 is more interesting, because in this case, the 
conflict could be resolved after the EU intervened and threatened to sanction Romania. In 
addition, the latter case is also more interesting, since Romania had already been an EU 
member for five years. At first it is necessary to briefly present some important facts about 
Romania’s constitutional setup.  
 
2.2.1 Romania´s constitutional  
 
According to Duverger, a semi-presidential political system can be seen as a third way 
towards a presidential and parliamentary system. Such a system has the aim to reach a 
political equilibrium between the parliament, the president and the governing cabinet (which 
follows the direction of the prime minister). In this political setting the prime minister and the 
president have to share executive powers.  As per a study conducted by Matthew S. Shugart 
and John M. Carey (1992), such a political system is very likely to lead to clashes between the 
later two. “With different sources of legitimacy—popular support for the president and the 
legislators’ confidence in the prime minister— both actors can claim more power and 
destabilize the equilibrium.”40 In addition, if “…the president and the prime minister belong 
to different political parties and the president’s party is not represented in government—a 
situation known as cohabitation…” arises.41 One could also say, that “… the prime minister 
enjoys the confidence of a Parliament hostile to the president.”42 Such a situation is especially 
risky in less consolidated political systems and can negatively affect the functioning of the 
democratic system.43  
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (2006) p. 2  
38 European Commission „Umfassender Monitoring-Bericht“ (2005) p. 34  
39 Euractiv “Romania braces for elections after president's ousting” (2007) 
40 Gherghina and Miscoiu (2013) p. 2   
41 Ibid. p. 2    
42 Ibid. p. 2   
43 Ibid. p. 3 
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2.2.2 Romania’s emergency decrees 
 
After having briefly presented the relevant background about the distinctive features of the 
Romanian political system, the actual case will now be presented. It is the aim of this sub-
chapter to highlight the EU´s response towards undemocratic activities in the 2012. The actual 
reasons for the 2012 crisis are not part of this paper.44   
However, the initial cause was a confrontation between the President Basescu (Liberal 
Democratic Party, PDL) who came into conflict with a very popular minister and as a 
consequence of protestations the opposition (led by the Social Liberal Union (USL), 
including: Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL)). These 
parties used the opportunity to get into government and elected Victor Ponta (USL) to become 
Prime Minister of Romania (May 2012). The governing President Basescu (PDL), who was 
unpopular due to austerity measures and reduced social benefits, was impeached by the 
Romanian Parliament (July 2012). In order to dismiss him out of office, the USL government 
had to take control of the institutions that could stand in way of their actions. Therefore, 
between the 3rd - 6th July 2012 “…a set of ‘blitzkrieg’ measures, violating key constitutional 
provisions and democratic procedures, were hastily implemented to pave the way for the 
President’s suspension.”45(For further information regarding the implemented measures 
consult: Ingi Iusmen (2014)). Crin Antonescu (PNL) who was politically aligned to Ponta 
became the new President. “Within a very short time frame, key constitutional provisions  and 
democratic principles were radically trampled upon, illustrating a trend of backsliding  on 
democratic values that had been embraced as part of EU membership requirements.“46 The 
accusation of the old governing President Basescu was an endeavour by the USL led coalition 
to be in command of the judicial system in Romania. This process is described as “state 
capture”, in which “…economic agents influence the state and vested interests converge with 
those of state officials to capture key state institutions in order to extract personal advantages 
(Pesic, 2007).”47 Already the Commission, in a report from 2009, highlighted the negative 
impact that powerful politicians have over the Romanian courts.48  
                                                 
44 For further information consult: Sergiu Gherghina and Sergiu Miscoiu (2013) “The Failure of Cohabitation”; 
Ingi Iusmen (2014) “EU leverage and democratic Backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe”  
45 Iusmen, (2014) p. 3     
46 Ibid. p. 4    
47 Ibid. p. 4    
48 European Commission (2009) p. 3 Interim report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the  
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The implemented emergency decrees were:  Dismissal of the ombudsman (he is the only one 
who has the power to bring a dispute against the government´s emergency ordinances before 
the Constitutional Court) 
- The Constitutional Court lost its ability to monitor the parliament decisions   
- Changed the referendum rules (lowering of the necessary threshold)49 
 
2.2.3 The EU´s reaction  
 
The undemocratic actions which have been undertaken by the Romanian Parliament and by 
the Prime Minister were generating a lot of criticism, both from western media and from the 
side of the EU. Viviane Reding, the Commissioner for Justice criticized Ponta´s actions and 
criticism also followed from the Commissions President Jose Manuel Barosso. He asked 
Romania to implement eleven policies in order to improve the lack of democratic standards. 
This list is also known as Barroso´s eleven commandments.50 It was Barros´s main concern to 
restore the rule of law.51 Criticism also came from the EPs President Martin Schulz, given the 
fact that he, similar to Ponta is also a Social Democrat. Besides Schulz the leader of the 
European People’s Party (EPP), Joseph Daul too disapproved the actions in Romania.  
 
In order to solve this issue Barosso and Van Rompuy (Council President) arranged for a 
meeting with Ponta on the 12th July 2012. In this meeting Ponta had to promise that he would 
follow the eleven measures to restore rule of law.52 With regards to this projects RQ, it is 
sufficient to mention that Romania had to: 
-  improve on the issue regarding the independence of the judiciary 
-  follow decisions by the constitutional court and restore the old powers of the court 
-  abstain to govern via emergency ordinances 
Ponta agreed to implement the recommendations and also promised to recognize the 
invalidity of the national referendum.53 (A referendum was held in Romania to impeach the 
existing president. Due to lack of participation the referendum was not officially valid.54  
 
                                                 
49 Iusmen (2014) p.3 
50 Euractive.com (2012)  
51 Iusmen (2014) p. 5 
52 Sedelmeier (2014) p. 12   
53 Ibid. p. 13 
54 For further information consult:  Sergiu Gherghina and Sergiu Miscoiu (2013) “Crises in Romania 
    The Failure of Cohabitation” p. 9 
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Besides the very harsh use of Article 7, the EU has three instruments in order to tackle 
democratic backsliding: Social Pressure, Infringement Procedures and Issue Linkage. (These 
tools will be further described in the third chapter).With regards to Romania, the EU 
exercised social pressure and issue linkage. The public shaming (in the form of speeches etc.) 
was used against Romania to pursue them in a normative way to change their behaviour.55 
Furthermore, a stronger tool in the case of Romania was “issue linkage” (consult section 3.6). 
Romania, besides Bulgaria was only allowed to join the Schengen area in 2014. Both 
countries should have actually joined Schengen in 2011, but this enlargement has since then 
been blocked by France, the Netherlands, Finland, Germany, and Austria.56 In addition, both 
countries are still subject to post-accession bi-annual reviews in order to assess their 
developments. “The EU’s influence in the Romanian case relied heavily on social pressure, 
although it was carried out in the shadow of explicit and implicit issue linkage.”57  
 
Since the accession of Romania (and Bulgaria), both countries are regularly monitored by the 
Commission.58 In the second annual report, which was published on the 18th, July 2012, the 
Commission stated that they were “…concerned by the recent pressure exercised by members 
of the Romanian Government and senior politicians on the Constitutional Court: these are 
unacceptable interventions against an independent judicial institution.”59 Such negative 
sanctions exercise pressure on the Romanian government and might offer a possible answer 
why Romania agreed to follow the eleven commandments.60  
 
 
2.3 Hungary  
 
Hungary joined on the 1st of May 2004 the European Union. The accession of Hungary was 
part of the 2004 Eastern Enlargement. After the parliamentary elections in April 2010 the 
former Socialistic party which had been in power for the last eight years, has been outvoted 
by the now governing Fidesz party (52.8 % equalling to 206 out of 386 seats in parliament).61 
The second rounds of election (held end of April 2010), gave further seats to the Fidesz party 
(now 263 out of 286), giving the party a two-thirds majority in parliament. This outcome 
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enables the Fidesz party to create a one party government. This is the first time in Hungary´s 
post communist history that the country is governed by just one party.62 This huge majority 
allows the party to implement new laws against the will of the parliamentary opposition. In 
brief, the main problem with Hungary is not that there is a super majority in the parliament 
but that this majority tried to control several political institutions and that this has been done 
violating checks and balances of the political system.63 The new government came for the first 
time came in conflict with the EU in December 2010, when the Hungarian government passed 
a new media law which will establish a new media authority agency which can impose huge 
fines over broadcast, online and print media. This agency is described as being very 
powerful.64 In addition, the members of this agency are all members of the governing Fidesz 
party. Therefore, this new law received a lot of criticism, because it was feared that the media 
freedom in Hungary would be diminished.65 The ruling Fidesz party received a lot of 
international criticism. The media law forces all existing media (print, television, online etc.) 
to be registered at a newly created government body. The Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) criticized the newly created National Media and Info-
communications Authority (NMHH), mentioning that this authority will receive: 
“...unprecedented powers in content regulation to the newly established media authority".66 
This new agency contains members of the present right-wing governing Fidesz party and has 
the power to impose a financial penalty (up to 720,000€) for news which are seen to be 
violating human dignity.67 Among the first ones to criticise the new media law was the 
president of the European Commission Manuel Barroso. Besides Barroso, other European 
politicians such as the German Deputy Foreign Minister Werner Hoyer have stated their 
worries regarding the new media agency.68  
 
2.3.1 The EU´s reactions towards Hungary  
 
The first action from the EU, which can be seen as a measure to restore the democratic 
backsliding, was a letter from Kroes directed to the Hungarian Deputy Prime Minister Tibor 
Navracsics. In this letter (send: 21st January 2011) Kroes addressed three issues which are of 
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concern to the Commission.69 Hungary replied a few days later, stating that the country would 
make changes to the newly adopted media law. These changes mainly concern following 
areas: 
“    -     The disproportionate application of rules regarding balanced information 
- The application of fines to broadcasters legally established and authorised in other EU 
countries 
- Rules on registration and authorisation of media service providers, and 
- Rules against offending individuals, minorities or majorities”70 
 
Kroes expressed her satisfaction with the changes, but criticism remained within the 
Hungarian opposition. As per the opposition, the main issues were not properly addressed 
such as the political control over the media agency. This view is also shared by Sedelmeier 
who states that the freedom “…of the press remains problematic since the Media Council 
‘still controls the entire broadcast sector and has [. . . the] legal power to reregulate print and 
online media’ (Bánkuti et al., 2012). In sum, the EU’s use of social pressure to achieve 
greater plurality and independence of the media was largely ineffective.”71 Bugarič  ads a 
further notion to this aspect. He refers to work from other scholars (Dawson and Muir, 2012) 
who state that Kroes bases her argument only on matters related to the internal market. 
Instead she (or the Commission) should have referred to Article 11 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU which ensures the protection of media freedom and 
pluralism.72 
The second step in the present Hungarian Constitutional crisis represents the change of 
the constitution. As per Bugarič  the new government managed in only three years (2010-2013) 
to “… transform Hungary from one of the success stories of the transition from socialism to 
democracy to a semi-authoritarian regime based on the illiberal constitutional order 
systematically dismantling checks and balances and thereby undermining the rule of law.”73 
All the changes to the constitution where achieved in a legal way, because the ruling party 
posses a two-thirds majority in the parliament. The result of all these changes is that most of 
the governmental power is within the executive and that in fact no real checks and balances 
exist. One can therefore speak of a “distinctive case of authoritarianism” which was 
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accomplished following legal means. Even though, the changes have been implemented 
legally, it is not possible to say that Hungary is a state which follows the rule of law because 
the executive branch of government is too strong and lacks any checks and balances. Since 
such core functions of a modern western constitution are not fulfilled the present constitution 
of Hungary can be seen as unconstitutional.74  
 
Other changes which had been implemented during the year 2011 are:  
- Change of the old constitution which required a four-fifths majority in the parliament 
to change the constitution, now only a two-third majority is sufficient  
- With this majority the Fidesz party could vote for its own people to be elected as 
constitutional judges 
- The court has less power in financial issues 
- The amount of constitutional judges was raised from eight to fifteen and the new 
places were filled by members of the Fidesz party.  
- The Fidesz government also put in place its former Vice Chairman (Pal Schmitt) as 
the new Hungarian President 
These new policy implementations gave the new Fidesz government the possibility to make 
changes to the constitution without any effective resistance.75 This new constitution was 
adopted in parliament (18th April 2011) under criticism from all the remaining opposition 
members and from EU politicians such as Martin Schultz (EP President).76 
 
2.3.2 Infringement procedures 
 
In March 2011, the monitoring committee of the Council of Europe (an institution that is 
outside the institutions of the EU) assigned the Venice Commission to analyse the new 
Hungarian constitution. Already in its first opinion (March 2011), the Venice Commission 
criticised the too speedy approval of the Constitution and the lacking public transparency 
during the adoption. Moreover, the Venice Commission also disapproved of the lack of 
consultation with the Hungarian society.77 After analysing the constitution the Venice 
Commission came to a negative conclusion. In brief, the Commission criticised: 
- The overuse of simple two-thirds majority to change key laws should remain as it was 
- The limitation of the Constitutionals Court powers regarding their say in the budget 
                                                 
74 Bugarič  (2014) p. 6 
75 Bugarič  (2014) p. 6 
76 Euractive.com (2011) “New constitution cements Hungarian ruling party's powers” 
77 Venice Commission (2011) p. 4   
22 
 
- The constitutional framework is rather unspecific with regards to the powers of the 
judiciary 
- Finally, the report also finds the weak protection by the Constitution regarding 
fundamental rights as faulty78  
 
After a warning from Barosso, the European Commission started with the infringement 
procedures against Hungary (17th, Jan. 2012).79 Already before the infringement procedures 
have started, the European Commission has warned Hungary to remove the legislation that 
will affect the independence of the Central Bank. Barroso in a letter to Orban referred to Art. 
130, which asks for the independence of the central bank  from any governmental 
intervention.80 The Commission started with the first stage of the infringement procedure and 
sent out three formal letters to Hungary. The country then had one month to respond. The 
Commissions asks for amendments regarding three main issues: 
1) Independence of the national central bank 
2) Independence of the judiciary 
3) Independence of the data protection supervisory authority81  
 
Even though Hungary said that they would make changes to the present (and still active) 
constitution, the Commissions started with the second stage of the infringement procedure 
(March 2012). This was done on the basis of Hungary’s response towards the accusations of 
the first infringement procedure. The Commission still saw room for further improvements 
and stated its disapproval of the Hungarian amendments:  
1) The first issue dealt with the retirement age of judges. Hungary has not yet defended 
their decision properly as to why the retirement age of the judges was set down from 
70 to 62 years. The Commission argues with the European rules on equal treatment in 
employment, which prohibits discrimination due to the age.  
2) The next issue addressed the independence of the data protection authority. 
 
In addition, the Commission also send out two administrative letters concerning: 
- The independence of Hungary´s judicial system 
- The independence of the central bank.82  
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On the 25th of April 2012, the Commission decided to drop the infringement procedure 
regarding the central bank independence. In their 1999th meeting the Commissioners Rhen 
and Reding were satisfied with the changes Hungary had implemented and agreed on a 
compromise to tackle remaining issues.83 This issue was fully dropped in July 2012, after the 
Commission, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank (ECB) were 
satisfied with the Hungarian implementations.84 It was from then on the task of the ECJ to 
decide about the other two infringement procedures. 
 
In March 2013, the fourth round of amendments to the Hungarian Constitution was passed by 
the government which also received a lot of criticism from the European MS´s.85 The main 
“problems” with these new amendments are: 
- Rulings of the Constitutional Court which were made before the entry of the new 
constitution (1.1.2012) will not be valid86 
    “- Restrictions on political advertisements in the publicly run media during election         
campaigns 
- A rule that university students can only get state grants if they pledge to work in 
Hungary after graduation 
- Fines or prison terms for homeless people who sleep on the streets.”87 
 
In a letter send to Orban (12.4.2012), Barroso mentioned his concerns regarding the 
compatibility of the new amendments with regards to EU law. It was especially criticised by 
the Commission that the powers of the Constitutional Court were further cut down. After a 
detailed analysis of the new amendments (done by the Venice Commission), there would be a 
possibility of implementing further infringement procedures.88  
 
The new legal adoptions were also discussed in the EP. Some of the MEPs were expressing 
their disapproval towards the present amendments, while others such as members of the EPP 
(European Peoples Party) were more neutral towards the present Hungarian situation.89 In 
order to further investigate the situation, the EP assigned the MEP Rui Tavares (Greens) to 
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come up with a report of the situation. The report which was adopted by the EP (4th July) 
recommends the Hungarian authorities that:  
“–   to fully restore the supremacy of the Fundamental Law by removing from it those 
provisions previously declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court; 
–   to reduce the recurrent use of cardinal laws in order to leave policy areas such as family, 
social, fiscal and budget matters to ordinary legislation and majorities;“90 In addition, the 
Resolution ends with suggesting that the EP should consider taking further measures such as 
Article 7 if Hungary does not comply.91 Similar to the just mentioned Tavares report, the 
Venice Commission criticized the lack of transparency, the process in which the constitution 
has been framed and the insufficient involvement of the Hungarian society.92 As a 
consequence, Hungary improved their constitution. One of the main aspects was that the 
powers of the constitutional court were re-established.93 The European Commission was 
satisfied with the compromise done by Hungary and dropped its infringement procedure 
(20.11.2013).94 However, until today the Commission has not yet dropped its last 
infringement procedure, regarding the data protection authority. A Memo of the Commissions 
(8.3.2014) the ECJ has backed up the Commissions opinion and that is now time for Hungary 
to make changes accordingly.95  
Also, in 2014 the EU continued to criticize Orbans politics. Recent examples were the 
high taxation of an independent TV station which is seen as a measure to cut off the company 
from its income. In addition, Orban received also criticism for his statement of building an 
“illiberal state” within the EU.96 
    
2.4 Comparison of the cases 
    
In each case there was a different reaction from the side of the EU. To begin with Austria, 
there was no official EU policy against the government. All the measures were done 
bilaterally, yet it is possible to see the Austrian case has been dealt with by the EU, because it 
was the Council Presidency who suggested to install the wise men. Similar to this, is the case 
with Romania and Hungary in which it was the EU which adopted measures in order to tackle 
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democratic backsliding. Remarkably in Romania is the fact that the EU could relatively easily 
restore the old status quo and get into agreement with Romania. This was also largely due to 
the fact that Romania had not yet gained access to the Schengen area. However the case is a 
bit more different in Hungary. The EU also makes an effort to tackle the situation, but their 
efforts do not always meet with success. It seems that the EU is still not powerful enough to 
finally solve the issue of Hungary´s democratic backsliding. The first criticisms towards 
Hungary started in late 2010 which still continuing. Every time Hungary adopts a new law, 
the EU has to catch up, but often only reaches a compromise (as has been shown in the case 
of the judiciary). Other cases, such as the media law remain untouched till today. Besides 
resolutions and discussions in the EP and the Commission, there has only been the three 
infringement procedure. It is also interesting to note that the case of Hungary is being dealt 
with over a very long period of time. In contrast to this, in the Austrian case, even though the 
new government have not yet adopted any laws, the MS´s were much stricter and very fast in 
their response.  
 
As has been mentioned in the Introduction, while looking at the differences between the three 
different cases the following research hypotheses appear:  
 
1) The EU is able to learn from previous cases of democratic backsliding  
2) There are different configurations of veto players for different cases  
3) The legal relationship between the EU and each of the analysed Ms (Austria, Romania 
and Hungary) is different and this difference affects the response of the EU towards 
each case. 
4) The form/level of democratic backsliding affects the way in which the EU can respond. 
5) With regards to each case, the EU has had different tools available in order to tackle 
democratic backsliding and the use of the various tools affects the response from the 
EU towards each case.  
 
To briefly recall, it is possible to briefly sum up each case: Austria is a case of a right-wing 
populistic party being part of the government. Romania is a case of a government 
undermining rule of law and governing with emergency decrees. The Hungarian case is 
characterised by the governing party eliminating step by step democratic checks and balances 
and turning more towards a semi authoritarian regime.97  
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3 Background Information 
 
 
3.1 The tools of the European Union in order to tackle democratic misbehaviour  
 
This sub-chapter will briefly outline all the EU´s relation towards human rights protection. 
Thereafter, the tools which the EU has at hand in order to tackle democratic misbehaviour 
within its MS will be presented as well. It is the aim of this section to present these tools and 
to name the important actors. 
 
3.2 The European Union’s take on Human rights and Democracy 
 
To begin the there are three official sources, regarding Human Rights, to which the EU is 
bound. Besides the legal principles developed by ECJ (derived from case law and rulings) the 
EU is bound to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and to the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (announced in 2000).98 Article 6, introduced in the Maastricht Treaty of 
1992, refers to the ECHR. The ECHR was adopted in 1953 and is today binding to 47 
States.99 Article 6 explicitly states, that the EU is “…founded on the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law…” and 
that the EU has to “… respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms…”100 The issue on human 
rights entered the European legal framework relatively late. This happened only with the 
adoption of the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties. Before that the ECJ mainly rested on the 
ECHR and on national human rights conventions.  
During time, the ECJ has ruled that the fundamental rights are not only binding 
towards the EU institutions itself but that also to the MS while acting within EU law. 
However, in reality the situation is not always clear cut, because it is often not apparent if MS 
are acting within the legal framework. In addition, some MS tend to be more reluctant 
towards the fact that the ECJ can decide upon the human rights which are applicable to the 
single MS.101 The latest development with regards to human rights within the EU is the 
Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA). The powers of this agency however are very limited and 
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it is mainly active in the fields of monitoring human rights violations and in being publishing 
reports.102  
 
3.3 Article 7 
 
Compared to the other mechanisms which are available to the EU, the application of Article 7 
(although never used) is the most severe punishment which is on hand to the EU.103 The 
application of this article, established with the Treaty of Nice (2003), allows the European 
Council to suspend the voting rights of a Member State in the Council. It is easiest to view the 
working of Article 7 as a three step procedure.  
1) The Council has at first the possibility to determine that there is a risk of a legal 
framework breach: “On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the 
European Parliament or by the Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four-
fifths of its members after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may 
determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of principles 
mentioned in Article 6 (1), and address appropriate recommendations to that 
State….”104  
2) In the following step, the Council has the possibility to decide that a breach actually 
exists: “The Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or Government 
and acting by unanimity on a proposal by one third of the Member States or by the 
Commission and after obtaining the assent of the European Parliament, may determine 
the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of principles 
mentioned in Article 6(1), after inviting the government of the Member State in 
question to submit its observations.”105 
3) “Where a determination under paragraph 2 has been made, the Council, acting by a 
qualified majority, may decide to suspend certain of the rights deriving from the 
application of this Treaty to the Member State in question, including the voting rights 
of the representative of the government of that Member State in the Council…”106 
Furthermore, it is mentioned, that the Council has to frequently monitor the accused MS, and 
also has the possibility to withdraw the sanctions if the accused MS has improved.  
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3.4 Infringement procedures 
 
The Articles 258 and 260 of the Treaty on the EU (TEU) mentions that if a MS fails to 
comply with EU law, procedures against this state have to be activated. The reason to activate 
such a procedure can be for instance the non-fulfilment of EU law by a MS. In this case, it is 
the task of the Commission (which is the guardian of the treaties) to initiate such a proceeding. 
There can be many sources from where the Commission gets its information (these are for 
example: individual complaints, complaints by countries or by the EP).107 
If the Commission initiates an infringement procedure, this procedure will at first start 
with an informal phase, followed by formal stage. The first phase of such a procedure is 
called “Infringement proceedings.” At this stage the Commission expresses its dissatisfaction 
over certain issues of the MS. The possibility is left then up to the MS to improve the breach 
of EU law voluntary. Each proceeding is preceded by research which is conducted by the 
Commission. In this pre-litigation phase, the Commission sends out letters in which the 
concern over a particular issue is expressed. It is then up to the MS to respond within the 
given deadline.108 The formal stage of the infringement procedure is reached when the 
Commission sends out a letter of formal notice to an accused MS. In such a letter, the 
Commission spells out in detail the issues of non-compliance and the Commission also 
expresses its concerns. In this letter the Commission gives the accused MS a time period 
(typically two months) in order for the accused MS to respond to the accusations. If this time 
period has passed without an agreement being reached, the Commission can formulate a 
reasoned opinion which mentions a time limit in which the MS has to solve the accusations.109 
If there have not been any serious improvements, the Commission can send the case further to 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ).110 The last word is with the ECJ which may issue a 
binding decision requiring the MS to rectify the violation of EU law.111  
 
3.5 Cooperation and Verification Mechanism 
 
When Romania and Bulgaria entered the EU during the second latest round of enlargement 
(2007), both countries were seen as lagging behind compared to the other countries of the 
2004 Eastern Enlargement. The accession of these two countries was different compared to 
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the previous enlargement.112 After the accession of both countries, had to demonstrate that 
rule of law was fully functioning in their administrative systems. As a response towards the 
shortcomings in both countries, the EU developed the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism (CVM). This was done by a Commission Decision in December 2006. This 
mechanism is a monitoring process that monitors the reform movement in both countries. 
The CVM Commission Decision for Bulgaria for example, mentions that:  
“The remaining issues in the accountability and efficiency of the judicial system and law 
enforcement bodies warrant the establishment of a mechanism for cooperation and 
verification of the progress of Bulgaria to address specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial 
reform and the fight against corruption and organised crime.”113 The Commission writes 
every six months a report in which the progress of the previously mentioned aspect is 
monitored and in which aspect are mentioned which should be improved before the next 
report. Generally, these reports are very detailed and, to be precise, monitor reforms in the 
administrative section, judicial issue and political developments. Therefore these reports are 
necessary to represent the reform momentum in both countries.114  
 
3.6 Issue Linkage and social pressure  
 
The negotiating tool of issue linkage has been in use since the beginning of the EU. As per 
Weber and Wiesmeth (1991) in political theory an international regime (such as the EU) is 
described as an actor which, with regards to decision making has a set “…of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations… .”115 Such an international 
regime, can exercise a so called “exchange of favours”. That means, that if actor A is 
dissatisfied with actor B`s present status quo, he can offer this actor a certain incentive (such 
as side payments) so that actor B is more willing to change its present status quo to be more in 
line with actor A`s policy preferences.116  
This concept is picked up and further elaborated by Johnston (2001) who adds this 
aspect to the concept of socialization theory in terms of international relations. Therefore, his 
contribution is well suited to this paper`s theoretical framework. Johnston mentions the 
aspects of material rewards and punishment. In order to follow their most important interests a 
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state will mostly respond to outer influences coming from an institution. It is the aim of the 
institution (in this paper´s case: The European Union), with tools such as regulations, 
membership or obligation to change the behaviour of an actor (in this case: a Member 
State).117 Regarding Johnston´s contribution to social pressure, it is at first important to 
mention his definition of social pressure. As per Johnston, successful social pressure can be 
seen, if an actor follows an idea (imposed by an exogenous actor) without having reached 
“private acceptance”.118 The opposite towards this can be if the actor would follow the ideals 
of the outer actor with private acceptance. In this context, private acceptance means that the 
governing actors within a MS are in favour of an exogenous implemented policy because the 
governmental actors have realised the benefits of the external policy. Moreover, successful 
implemented social pressure can have the effect that one actor might: 
- feel as being an outsider of a particular group 
- experience a lack of comfort while being in interaction with other actors 
- reputational damage and losing prestige, wealth and trustworthiness.119  
Finally, for social pressure to be effective it is necessary that there exists a public forum in 
which the social pressure can visible be exercised.120 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
117 Johnston (2001) p. 1    
118 Ibid. p. 13 
119 Ibid. p. 13f 
120 Ibid. p. 16 
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4 Methodology 
 
 
Overview 
This chapter will introduce the reader how the Analysis will be set up and which 
methodological implications underlie the analytical chapter. Besides this, the nature of this 
project will be presented as well as the reason for the choice of cases.   
 
4.1 Choice of cases 
 
As has been mentioned in the Introduction, this paper is focusing on three relatively similar 
cases. The cases have been chosen in order to show the different responses from the side of 
the EU towards democratic backsliding in the MS. To begin with, in a very brief overview 
one can say, that the independent variable in this paper are the different forms of democratic 
backsliding and the dependent variable is the European Union’s responses towards each case. 
These variables will be further specified in more detail later. It is the aim of this chapter to 
generate hypothesis which are going to be later tested in the analysis section.  
 
These hypotheses have been produced via abductive reasoning. With the process of abductive 
reasoning, new knowledge (here in the form of the five hypothesis) has been reached. In brief, 
abductive reasoning takes it starting point from observations and then continues to find most 
possible explanations for the given case by drawing on existing theoretical knowledge. In this 
way, most medical diagnoses are taken. Abductive reasoning therefore creates a hypothesis 
which then can be either further verified or falsified.121  
The five hypotheses have been derived abductively at the conclusion of the empirical 
section. After having done the empirical work, differences between each country were found. 
Out of these differences the five hypotheses were drawn. Besides the variation on the 
independent variable, there is also variation on the dependent variable. To recall, the 
dependent variable represents the different answers from the EU towards each form of 
democratic backsliding. The different responses can be re-viewed in the empirical section.  
 
To recall briefly the dependent variables:  
- Austria: right-wing populist party being part of the government, faced by bilateral 
sanctions from the EU 14-MS 
                                                 
121 Halperin and Heath (2012) p. 425; Butte College (2014)  
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- Romania:  Romania is a case of a government undermining rule of law and governing 
with emergency decrees; pressured successfully by the Commission in withholding 
access to the Schengen Area  
- Hungary: case of a government eliminating step by step democratic checks and 
balances and  turning more towards a semi authoritarian regime 
 
In the analysis section, the three hypotheses will be answered by matching up empirical 
findings with the contributions from the theoretical parts. This will provide the basis to either 
confirm or reject the three hypotheses.   
 
4.2 Examination of the cases  
 
Since only a few countries have been chosen, there is the theoretical risk that this project 
might risk a selection bias. However, the three countries have not been chosen due to the 
dependent variable.122 The countries where picked out, after the different responses of the EU 
towards democratic backsliding have been observed.  The selected cases have been mainly 
picked because the differences between each case are suited to confirm or reject the 
previously presented research hypothesis. After having observed the three cases, it was found 
out, that the EU responded differently to each case. As a consequence of this, hypothesis were 
established which have to be tested. The variation on the dependent variable and how each 
MS´s specific case of democratic backsliding has contributed to the hypothesis generation 
will be further presented in a later sub section. At first the issue of selection bias will be 
addressed further.  
 
Similar to each of the chosen cases is that there is or has been a conflict between each of the 
three MS and the EU over each countries democratic backsliding. Although the nature of the 
conflict between the EU and each MS has different reasons, similar to these countries is the 
fact that the EU tried (or in the case of Hungary, still tries) to tackle democratic backsliding. 
However, to be precise, neither the countries conflict with the EU regarding democratic 
backsliding are identical, nor are the countries easily comparable to each other. In addition, 
these cases are not the only ones with regards to democratic backsliding. Similar events 
occurred in Bulgaria, Latvia, Italy or France.123 While looking at the time dimension, the 
                                                 
122 Landman (2004) p. 46f     
123 Demos (2013) p. 40ff; (For further information regarding each of the just mentioned country cases, please    
consult the following article: Backsliders: Measuring Democracy in the EU (2013) chapter 2 written by the UK 
political think-tank Demos)  
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cases of Austria and Romania lasted just for several months, while the Hungarian case started 
in 2011 (although Budapest already received criticism by the EU in late 2010). Moreover, the 
case with Hungary was at the time this paper was written, not fully settled.  
 
The countries are therefore chosen, because the EU criticised the present violation of basic 
EU freedoms and an accelerating form of democratic backsliding. Therefore the countries are 
comparable in the way the EU tries to tackle the democratic misbehaviour in each country.  
Responding to selection bias, from the standpoint of this project, it has been recognised that in 
order to fully avoid having selection bias, all 28 MS would have had be taken into 
consideration. For each MS, it will have to be examined if there is or has been an issue which 
can be seen as a form of democratic backsliding. In addition, in those cases where 
undemocratic issues happened (for example Latvia or Italy), it would actually be necessary to 
look at the cases where the EU undertook action and where the EU did not do anything to 
improve the situation.124 For example, the EU has criticised France (for its inhuman treatment 
of the Roma population) and Greece (for its inhuman treatment of refugees). These aspects 
will be kept in mind, during the formulation of the concluding section.125   
 
As already pointed out in the previous section, the following section will emphasise the 
selection towards the dependent variable. The cases have been selected because they help to 
answer the different hypotheses presented earlier. The cases of Austria, Romania and 
Hungary have been chosen because the differences between these three MS help to answer the 
different hypotheses.  
 
4.3 Case selection 
 
To begin with Austria, this country has been longer part of the EU than Romania and Hungary 
(Austria: 1995, Hungary: 2004 and Romania: 2007).126 It is part of the old EU-MS (EU-15) 
and has been since 1945 governed as a democracy.127 Furthermore, it was the first country in 
which democratic backsliding was criticised by the EU and also by other international actors. 
The case of Austria (in 2000) can be seen as the beginning of the establishment of the EU´s 
sanctioning measures. After this case, Article 7 became part of EU law (Treaty of Nice, 
                                                 
124 Demos (2013) p. 29f 
125 Human Rights Watch (2013)  p. 423ff 
126 European Union – Enlargement 
127 Demokratiewebstatt.au  
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2003).128 This article was the first attempt by the EU to directly tackle anti-democratic 
policies within the Member States. In contrast to this, the infringement procedures which have 
been established during the founding treaties, only tackle MS misbehaviour based on the 
violation of the free market freedoms. Article 7 refers directly back to article 2 which states 
that the Union”… is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the  rule of law and respect for human rights, …”.129 Therefore the case of Austria, 
when compared to the other later cases, allows this paper to monitor the time dimension of the 
EU´s responses. This case therefore directly directs the research towards the first hypothesis.  
 
Also, the differences between the countries allow to look at the role and influence of veto 
players (leading therefore to the second hypothesis). The analysis will later examine if veto 
players were active within each case and how influential they were. For instance, with regards 
to Hungary, it is so far possible to say, that the key veto player was the EPP which was acting 
under the rules of Article 7 (consult Background section). With regards to Romania, one can 
say, that this case is characterised by having the European Commission as a veto player. 
Regarding this hypothesis, different constellation of veto players mattered in each of the 
different cases.  
  
The case of Romania adds to the third hypothesis, because this country has had a different 
legal relationship with the EU than Austria or Hungary. By the time the EU was about to 
sanction Romania, this country (and Bulgaria) was still subject to post-accession conditions 
(among other things: no full access to the Schengen area) and not a 100% independent MS 
such as the other 26 MS. Because of that difference it is important to look at the effect of 
different kinds of relationships between the EU and the MS.  
 
With regards to the fourth hypothesis, it is noteworthy that the cases can be clustered in two 
kinds of democratic backsliding. That is: Austria has had a rightwing populist party in 
government; Romania has been governed by a government which used emergency decrees, 
Hungary was and still is subject to infringement proceeding regarding the independence and 
freedom of governmental organs. Romania and Hungary can be put into one group, namely: 
The undermining of democratic institutions by the government. These different forms ask for 
a different response towards each of the “two” cases.   
                                                 
128 Democracy Reporting International (2013) p 2      
129 Treaty of Nice 2003, Article 2  
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Finally, each of the cases were happening at a different point in time and the EU has had 
different tools available for each case. To recall briefly, during the case of Austria, there have 
not been any tools available. This was different during the “crisis” in Romania and Hungary, 
however, with regards to last two cases, the same tools where available but in each case 
different tools were used. This difference has led to the establishment of the fifth hypothesis. 
 
The aim of this paper is to answer the research hypothesis, as a consequence of this it will also 
be possible to use the findings gathered in this paper for future similar cases. Therefore, the 
analysis of the information from the different cases can give evidence to answer the 
hypothesis and to draw further assumptions to similar cases (which might happen in near 
future with regards to other 28 MS or new MS which are not yet part of the EU). To embed 
this paper, one can see this paper as an explorative case study. There is no existing body of 
literature to which one could refer back. The characteristics of the dependent variable are 
useful for the generation of hypotheses which can then be tested in the analytical section. In 
addition, it is this projects contribution to present confirmed or rejected hypotheses which can 
be used for further research and to serve as a building block for the generation of a new theory.  
 
4.4 Nature of this projects case study 
 
The nature of this project, as can be assumed by the title, will be a case study done by 
investigative into three cases (small N case study). So far there is no common definition of 
how to define a case study. As Levy states, in the face of “… the widespread use of case study 
methods throughout the social sciences, no consensus has emerged as to the proper definition, 
either of a case or a case study.”52 The same view is shared by Gerring: “Regretfully, the term 
“case study” is a definitional morass”53, and always represents a trade-off.54 There is a 
different perception within academic literature of what to can be seen as a case study.  (…) 55 
A case study can range from analysing a single community, a city, an organisation or even a 
single historical event.56 Gerring argues that also a “…country may function as a case, a unit, 
a population, or a case study.”57/ 130 The definition of a case study depends on what the 
researcher is basing his argumentation on.131 With regards to the nature of this paper it is 
possible to classify it as a variable oriented type of comparative study. As per the literature, in 
such a case, the focus lies on the relationship between variables which are placed across a few 
                                                 
130 This part has been taken from the project: Independence Movement in Scotland written by Rolf Peter Greve 
(2014) p. 15f 
131 Gerring (2004) p. 2f 
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(or many) selected countries.132 A case study is always directed to shed light on a specific 
issue in order to get a deeper understanding.133 Operationalizing this concept with regard to 
this papers research view, it means that not the three countries are in foreground of this 
analysis but the testing and verification of the three hypotheses.  
 
Finally, this paper`s case perspective is based on Most Similar System Design (MSSD). 
MSSD is based on the choice of “… countries that share many (theoretically) important 
characteristics, but differ in one crucial respect (related to the hypothesis of interest).”134 With 
regards to this paper`s case, the three to be analysed countries actually are different and can be 
clearly separated between old (Austria) and new (Hungary and Romania) MS. Furthermore, 
common to these MS should be (or should have been) well established democracies which 
completely fulfil the Copenhagen criteria.135 Yet, the main difference between the countries is 
not the distinction between old and new MS, but the differences are those which are captures 
by the five different hypotheses. This project is designed to test the three mentioned 
hypotheses in order to answer the Research Question. 
 
4.5 Material used in this project and source criticism        
                                                          
The material used for this paper will be almost of qualitative nature. This will be a mixture of 
primary and secondary sources. With regards to primary sources, this paper will look at 
documents published by the various European Institutions (such as Reports and adopted Texts 
from the European Parliament or documents/statements from the Commission). These 
primary sources are all accessible from the homepages of the EU institutions. Besides these 
sources, secondary sources such as academic articles and news paper articles will be used as 
well. The documents used are published by the European Parliament and by the Commission. 
Given the nature of the three to be analysed hypotheses and the given material, it has been 
chosen to do a qualitative case study. This approach is most suited. Importance will be given 
to be critical with the available data and have no naïve interpretation of the material. This is 
especially important for the material published by the European Union. The analysis will be 
carried out as objective as possible, in order to avoid research bias.   
 
                                                 
132 Todd (2004) p. 263 
133 Somekh and Lewin (2011) p. 53f 
134 Halperin and Heath (2012) p. 210 
135 European Commission (2014) “Conditions for membership”; Democracy Reporting International  p. 3ff  
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4.6 Delimitation 
 
The following will present very shortly the areas this project is not discussing. To mention the 
aspects this thesis is not covering is helpful in order to keep track regarding the direction of 
this project and to avoid wrong expectations as per the outcome of the research. To be recall, 
this projects main aim is to test the three hypotheses. To be precise, the general effectives of 
the measures the EU used will not be analysed as well as the role of and influence of 
individual political actors. The papers focus is within the EU and the European Institutions. 
Furthermore, reading the Empirics section, the question about the legitimacy with regards to 
democratic backsliding might appear. In the end, all the new governments have been 
democratically voted into power (as per the then valid constitution). This is not subject of this 
paper. Also the underlying reasons for the occurrence of the observed different forms of 
democratic backsliding will not be analysed. Besides this, the possible influence of other 
international actors (such as the United States) will not be taken into consideration. The focus 
is on the EU. Finally, neither the causes (political or economical ones) nor the aspect of 
Euroscepticism will be discussed further.  
 
4.7 How the RQ will be answered  
 
In order to conduct the Analysis chapter, the first three hypotheses will be examined. To 
briefly recall, these are: 
1) The EU is able to learn from previous cases of democratic backsliding  
2) There are different configurations of veto players for different cases  
3) The legal relationship between the EU and each of the analysed Member States 
(Austria, Romania and Hungary) is different and this difference affects the response of 
the EU towards each case. 
These hypotheses have been chosen because it is viewed that these seem to cover the most 
fundamental aspects in order to shed light on the RQ. The hypotheses that will not be dealt 
with are: 
4) The form/level of democratic backsliding affects the way in which the EU can respond. 
5) With regards to each case, the EU has had different tools available in order to tackle 
democratic backsliding and use of the various tools affects the response from the EU 
towards each case.  
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It has been so far the work of this project to establish five different research hypotheses and 
the most relevant will be addressed. The conclusions and the answer to the RQ, will therefore 
be based on the first three hypotheses. The two just mentioned hypotheses will not be 
addressed because Sedelmeier already discussed these aspects. The implications of not having 
discussed these two hypotheses will be picked up in the Afterthoughts section. Even though 
hypotheses four and five will not be examined, they will still be linked up to the theoretical 
framework so that this can serve as a starting point for future research.  
  In order to conduct this Analysis, each of the hypotheses will be discussed separately 
along with the suited theoretical concepts (as has been mention dint eh theory chapter). With 
regards to each of the three hypotheses, the theoretical material along with just described 
empirical material will be used. In order to get a deeper understanding of the cases and the 
corresponding hypothesis academic literature will therefore also be consulted.  
 
4.8 Theory of science - Ontology and Epistemology 
 
In this section the theoretical positions with regards to the ontological and epistemological 
position of this paper will be presented. It is relevant to present these two aspects, because 
these concepts express this papers academic view on the kind of knowledge which can be 
gathered in social science and how to perceive the validity of the gathered information. Due to 
the fact, that the tools which are used in this work mainly rely on observation and the reviews 
of academic articles, the values and assumptions on which this work is based need to be 
highlighted.136 To begin with Ontology, this term refers to questions such as: Is there a reality 
that exists without that the researcher himself is actually aware of?  Of which aspect does the 
phenomenon, a social science researcher is interested to investigate, consist of? In relation to 
this aspect, the term of Epistemology refers to the type of knowledge. Here, a typical question 
a researcher would ask could be: What facts or pieces of information can be gathered about a 
particular aspect? Or: How does the researcher know that the available pieces of knowledge 
are suited to conduct research.137  
Suited for this paper is the critical realist approach. The view is taken because it is 
assumed that social reality (with regards to this project, the working within the European 
Institutions) exists without that the researcher is aware of this. Therefore reality is sees as 
consisting of observable and unobservable aspects. Getting objective knowledge of social 
reality is seen as being possible. In addition, social events even if they cannot be measured 1:1 
                                                 
136 Foundation of qualitative research in education (2014) 
137 Halperin and Heath (2012) p. 25f; Marsh and Furlong (2002) p. 17ff   
39 
 
as natural events, can be understood with the help of a theoretical framework. In line with 
this, a critical interpretation of social reality is needed, which is in line with the theoretical 
concepts, to get an understanding of social events.138  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
138 Halperin and Heath (2012) p. 35ff 
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5 Theory 
 
 
In order to answer this project`s hypotheses, a theoretical background is needed. This theory 
chapter will be split in two sections. In accordance with the hypotheses, at first rational 
choice/institutionalist authors will be presented, followed by a second section which presents 
social constructivist perspectives. This theoretical lens has been selected, because it is the aim 
of this paper to get a deeper understanding of the EU´s institutions and their behaviour 
towards the three cases.  
 
Rational choice theory fits, because it can analyse anything, ranging from individuals to 
organisations to states. In this theoretical case, rational choice should be seen as a family of 
theories which are bonded by common assumptions. Nevertheless, this family of theories is 
helpful to “… provide testable hypotheses and insights into the politics of various political 
systems, including the European Union.”139 Moreover, the focus is on rational choice 
institutionalism because, as will be shown later, this theory seems to be most useful and has 
been very popularly used in academic debate. “… RCI and principal-agent analysis have 
emerged over the past decade as the dominant approach to the study of the Commission and 
other executive actors such as the European Central Bank and the growing body of EU 
agencies.”140 The second theoretical perspective which is going to be presented in this chapter 
belongs to the area of social constructivism. The reader could logically assume, that 
sociological institutionalism will follow in order to be in line with the other theoretical 
notions. However the focus on constructivism has been chosen because it takes a closer look 
at the influence of external events on institutional decision making. In contrast to this, 
sociological institutionalism tends to focus more on the influence of institutions on individual 
decision making.141 However, the differences between these two schools of thoughts are 
relatively marginal. 
 
5.1 Previous contributions  
 
Before presenting the above mentioned rather general theoretical framework, it is also 
important to present the existing literature describing how the EU handles different forms of 
                                                 
139 Pollack (2006) p. 3  
140 Ibid. p. 8   
141 Saurugger (2014) p. 94f and 152f; Checkel (1999) p. 6  
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democratic backsliding. Having in mind the existing contributions fortifies the use of the 
above mentioned RCI and constructivist theories.  
 
5.1.1 Contribution from Sedelmeier 
 
Sedelmeier is one author who has given so far the most useful contribution. Regarding the 
case of democratic backsliding, he asks: “Why was the EU better at stopping backsliding in 
Romania than in Hungary? And how can we explain differences across issue areas in 
Hungary?”142 Also, in the case of Austria, it was much easier for the EU-14 MS to agree on 
Sanctions against Vienna, even though the case was less concerning compared to the present 
case in Hungary.143 In his article he is mainly concerned to answer two questions: The first 
one focuses on Article 7 and why did the EU not use its most powerful tool to contain 
Hungary into its borders. The second main question Sedelmeier addresses asks: “Why was the 
EU better at stopping backsliding in Romania than in Hungary? And how can we explain 
differences across issue areas in Hungary?”144 
 
In order to answer the first research question, Sedelmeier focuses on how to understand the 
variation in actors preferences (European Parliament parties and the different 27 MS). In 
order to answer these questions he also relies on rationalist and constructivist explanations 
because both set of theories complement each other, as has already been pointed out in this 
paper.145 With these set of theories in mind, he designs four hypotheses:  
 
His hypotheses are:  
1) Domestic Partisan Politics Hypothesis: A Member State government supports 
sanctions if the opposition parties’ normative commitment to liberal democratic values 
is weak. 
2) International Partisan Politics Hypothesis: A Member State government (EP party 
group) supports sanctions if it is ideologically distant from the government party of the 
target state.  
3) Liberal Democratic Norms Hypothesis: A Member State government (EP party group) 
supports sanctions if it has a strong normative commitment to liberal democratic 
values.  
                                                 
142 Sedelmeier (2014) p. 3 
143 Ibid. p. 4 
144 Ibid. p. 3 
145 Ibid. p. 4 
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4) Supranational Integration Hypothesis: A Member State government (EP party group) 
supports sanctions if it has a strong normative commitment to European integration.146 
 
Due to shortcomings with regards to data, he does not address the first hypothesis. This will 
be up for future research. However, to briefly conclude his findings: Transnational party 
politics in fact play a role regarding the decision within the EP in order to decide to start the 
Article 7 mechanisms. Besides these voting patterns in the EP, it is also important to look at 
the normative commitment to liberal democracy. As per Sedelmeiers findings, actors who 
have a high commitment towards liberal democracy, tend to support sanctions against 
undemocratic MS regardless of their orientation towards Partisan politics. On the other hand, 
partisan “…orientation only matters if an actor does not have a strong commitment to liberal 
democracy (that is, has a TAN orientation): these actors will support sanctions against 
ideological rivals abroad and oppose them if they target their partisan allies.”147 
With regards to the above mentioned second question, Sedelmeier looks at the second 
part of his paper at the different tools which have been used by the EU. These tools are social 
pressure, infringement procedures and issue linkage (as have been described in the second 
empirics section). He investigates the reasons for the different levels of success of these tools 
within the cases of Romania and Hungary. His findings are that the EU was more effective in 
tackling democratic backsliding in the case of Romania compared to Hungary. In Hungary, 
the EU had more power with regards to issues that were subject to infringement procedures 
and here compliance was much easier to agree on. In Romania, in general there was good 
compliance due to the tool of issue linkage (access to the Schengen area). Only in terms of 
corruption control Romania still lagged behind. In contrast to this, in the Hungarian case, the 
EU was less successful on issues in which it used only social pressure (social pressure has 
been used in order to improve the 2010 implemented media law). In comparison to this, the 
activities of the EU were having a better performance, in issues in which the case could be 
linked to financial aid and with the help of infringement procedures.148  
 
                                                 
146 Ibid. p. 5f 
147 Ibid. p. 8f 
148 Ibid. p. 13f 
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149 
 
To sum up, Sedelmeier concludes that the success of EU sanctions very much depends on the 
aspect of material sanctions. As per him, the EU, “…might only be able to rectify post-
accession backsliding under a very demanding constellation of conditions that allow it to 
apply both social and material pressure. This interpretation would lead us to a rather 
pessimistic assessment of the EU’s ability to counteract democratic backsliding in its 
members... ”.150  
 
5.1.2 Contribution from Iusmen 
 
Besides Sedelmeier, Iusmen has also delivered research about the case of democratic 
backsliding with focus on Romania and Hungary. In contrast to the above referred literature, 
he focuses on domestic factors which might be able to influence the success of the EU in 
order to fight against democratic backsliding.151 To briefly sum up his findings, the article 
provides “… crucial empirical evidence demonstrating that the EU’s material leverage, in 
particular, could shape the reversal of anti-democratic processes in Romanian specifically due 
to a set of domestic factors that facilitated compliance with EU demands in the first place. To 
briefly mention these factors, Iusmen highlights that the domestic factors are: political 
miscalculations of the Romanian government and tensions within the governing coalition.152 
Similar favourable domestic conditions and post-accession conditionality, such as the CVM 
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150 Ibid. p. 15f 
151 Iusmen (2014) p. 1 
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and Schengen Area membership, were lacking in the Hungarian case.”153 Given Iusmen`s 
contribution, his work brings up the possibility of adding a sixth hypothesis. Such a 
hypothesis could investigate for example the effect or the power of domestic actors (within 
the EU-MS) in order to tackle democratic backsliding.  
 
5.1.3 Contributions from the Austrian case 
 
Similar to the cases of Romania and Hungary, there are also contributions which evaluate the 
Austrian case. To begin with Happold, he mentions that the Commission would only follow 
the sanctions of the 14-MS when Austria would be in breach of the European treaty on human 
rights protection. As per current EU law, Austria has not yet done anything wrong and 
therefore the EU has had no mandate to get active.154 Besides his contribution, Merlingen, 
Mudde and Sedelmeier also analysed the case of Austria and add two other aspects to the case.  
At first, the authors provide evidence that human rights issues which are based on the 
normative belief that the EU is founded on (idea of democracy and human rights protection) 
provide one explanation for the actions of the 14-MS. However, the identity aspect cannot 
explain the action towards Austria in itself. In relation to this, the authors also present findings 
that self interested individual politicians have played an important role in pushing towards 
sanctions.155  
This project will build up on the conclusion by a think tank mentioning that due to the 
Austrian case, the MS agreed to change Article 7. This aspect will be further picked up in 
more detail in the Analysis.156  
 
 
5.2 Rational Choice in European Union Studies 
 
The following contributions with regards to rational choice theories are especially helpful in 
answering hypotheses three, four and five:  
(3) The legal relationship between the EU and each of the analysed MS (Austria, Romania 
and Hungary) is different and this difference affects the response of the EU towards each case. 
(4) The form/level of democratic backsliding affects the way in which the EU can respond. 
                                                 
153 Ibid. p. 14 
154 Happold (2000) p. 5f 
155 Merlingen, Mudde and Sedelmeier (2001) p. 16 
156 Crismart (2000) p. 3f 
45 
 
(5) With regards to each case, the EU has had different tools available in order to tackle 
democratic backsliding and the use of the various tools affects the response from the EU 
towards each case.  
With regards to these hypotheses, the to be presented concepts such as actors preference, 
strategic interaction, benefits of cooperation and the concept of shared believes will help to 
understand how: 
- The different forms of legal relationship affect the way the EU handles democratic 
backsliding (hypothesis three) and how 
- The use of the tools, which are available to the EU, are influencing the EU´s response. 
 
In order to use rational choice theory in the analysis of politics (also EU studies) it is 
important to mention that this theory rests on three assumptions.  
1) For rational choice analyses the basic units to be observed are individuals. This school 
of thought aims to explain the behaviour of individuals and groups (= sum of 
individual choices).  
2) In this view, individuals have a set of fixed preferences and proceed in a way which 
maximizes their benefits/utility. This view stands in contrast to Risse (2002) who 
argues that individuals follow social norms and act in ways which are appropriate to 
the situation and which are guided by the approach to stick to the “better” 
solution/argument.  
3) The decisions individuals face, are done so under constraints. This means that often a 
decision has to be taken on the basis of incomplete information. Furthermore, the ideal 
state of the world is not constructed but the individuals can choose between different 
alternatives.157 
 
Rational choice institutionalism therefore also focuses on the effects formal and informal 
institutions have on the behaviour of individuals. In addition it needs to be kept in mind, that 
rational choice theory belongs to a family of similar theories which share basic assumptions 
but are applicable to different actors.158  Moreover, the EP has been focus of much academic 
analysis and it can be classified as “… a ‘normal parliament’ whose members vote predictably 
and cohesively within a political space dominated by the familiar contestation between.”159 
 
                                                 
157 Pollack (2006) p. 2  
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5.2.1 Criticism to rational choice theory 
 
There also exists criticism towards this rational choice theory (RCT). This criticism can be 
distinguished into internal critiques (which focus on methodological terms) and external 
critiques (focusing on the approach as a whole).  
Internal critiques:  
- RCT are often too abstract and are based on factors which are which are difficult to 
observe 
- Models are often produced ad hoc in order to fit to certain data and alternative 
explanations are left unaddressed 
External critiques: 
- RCT lacks the ability to highlight the key actors and to clarify the interests. In addition, 
there is also a look to understand the origin of institutions and how these change over 
time.  
For these reasons Pollack states that RCT should be supplemented with constructivist 
theories.160 In the analytical chapter, these criticisms will be taken into consideration.   
 
5.2.2 Institutional theories  
 
To begin with the first set of theories, the concept of new institutionalism will be used. At this 
point it needs to be mentioned that the theoretical literature used was published almost 20 
years ago (1996). However, despite its age, the contributions of this range of theories are 
useful for this paper. To give a brief overview, new institutionalism can be subdivided into 
three different schools of thoughts: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism 
and sociological institutionalism.161  
For this research paper, as already mentioned previously the contributions of rational choice 
institutionalism seem to be most suited. However, the framework regarding historical 
institutionalism could also be suited for this work. The implications of having used this 
approach will be discussed in the Afterthoughts section. In addition, at this point it is not 
necessary to discuss the origins and development of rational choice institutionalism (For 
further information, consult Hall and Taylor “Political Science and the three new 
institutionalisms” (1996) p 7ff). The academic debate of rational choice is cantered on four 
main aspects. 
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1) Rational choice theorists assume that political actors have a fixed set of preferences 
and issues which are most important to them. It is assumed that these actors behave in 
a way that maximises their own benefit and work so accordingly. The goals are 
achieved in a “… highly strategic manner that presumes extensive calculation.”162 
2) The next part discusses the image of politics and the related consequences. If 
individual politicians pursue the interests which are closest too their own interests and 
agendas, the possible outcome for the greater political community can be suboptimal. 
This means that instead of finding a cooperative solution based on consensus a 
solution arises in which some parties are better of than others. Classical examples of 
such “egoistic” behaviour are the “prisoner dilemma” or “the tragedy of the commons 
examples” (for further information consult: Cf. G. Hardin, ‘The tragedy of the 
commons’, Science 162 (1968)). In addition, such a suboptimal outcome is likely to 
arise if no facilitating institutions exist which have the power to enforce an outcome 
that is beneficial to everyone.163     
3) Another aspect of RCI is that the assumption that the behaviour of an actor is driven 
by the outcomes of strategic interactions. To be more specific, this means that a 
rational actor makes his decision according to his expectations of other actors’ 
behaviour. The present decisions and behavioural patterns are therefore not a 
consequence of historical learning or socialisation, but of a day to day cost-benefit 
analysis.164 
4) In the end, the last part tries to explain the reasons and the underlying structures which 
stand for the establishment of institutions. As per the theoretical contribution, actors 
create institutions in order to achieve their common goals from cooperating commonly. 
Therefore, institutions are created by actors on a voluntary basis. In addition, such an 
established institution is seen to survive due to it being functional, they way it is, to all 
the participating actors.  
 
5.2.3 Contributions by Garrett and Weingast with focus on new institutionalism 
 
The following sub chapter is meant to complement the previous theoretical notions. The 
contributions from Garrett and Weingast with regards to frequent cooperation, ideas and 
shared believes will be presented in this sub chapter. Their contribution is useful to answer the 
                                                 
162 Ibid. p. 10  
163 Ibid. p. 10   
164 Ibid. p. 10   
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third hypothesis “The legal relationship between the EU and each of the analysed MS (Austria, 
Romania and Hungary) is different and this difference affects the response of the EU towards 
each case” because the authors discuss concepts of relationship and regular cooperation 
between institutions and states. In addition to this, an aspect not covert in the literature is the 
reason why actors agreed to a certain way of cooperation/agreement. The question posed by 
Garrett and Weingast focuses on the possibility of having agreed to different cooperative 
outcomes. “…existing studies shed little light on the question why one particular cooperative 
solution was chosen”.165 Here Garrett and Weingast add the notion of shared ideas and 
common perceptions. Such common ideas can act as a focal point to which all actors can 
agree. Shared beliefs as to how do organize/conduct certain activities is important, because 
treaties/agreements itself can not cover each possible aspect. For this reason, shared beliefs 
can influence the way in which actors cooperate among each other and this shared beliefs can 
also influence the stability of arrangements over time.  
Finally, the concept of the effect of so called constructed focal points is another 
important aspect from Garretts and Weingasts contribution. At first it is necessary to mention 
that the role of ideas and shared perceptions is necessary in order to establish common 
institutions.166 Building up on this concept Garrett and Weingast argue that actors might have 
different views on the focal points.  “We suggest that the influence of focal points and shared 
belief systems is likely to vary significantly with the structure of given strategic 
interactions.”167 The more actors are equal in their power resources and the lesser the 
differences in the to be achieved outcomes are, the more important the role of ideational 
factors are. In this sense, such focal points will determine how actors behave given the fact 
that there are flat power relations between each of the actors.168 
 
5.2.4 Theory regarding veto players  
 
This contribution helps to understand how veto players are located within the political 
decision making system and how these veto players user their ability to change the political 
outcome. This theory is necessary for the answer of the second hypothesis. From the 
contribution of Tsebelis, focus will be on the first chapter regarding individual veto players. 
Amongst his contributions regarding veto players, he has also written a chapter focusing 
directly on the EU, however this chapter is not useful for this project because Tsebelis focuses 
                                                 
165 Garrett and Weingast (1993) p. 175 
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in this chapter on the power distributions between the individual EU institutions (such as the 
Commission or the EP), and he also takes a look at the different decision making procedures. 
With regards to answering the hypothesis regarding the influence of veto players, it is relevant 
to only look at the European Parliament and the behaviour of the relevant veto players.  
As per Tsebelis, the outcome of a political institution can be seen as the sum of 
collective decision making. For this reason, all the involved actors have an interest to promote 
policies which are in line with their interests. As per his definition, veto players are 
individuals or collective actors who need to give their consent in order to change the status 
quo. Such veto players, as per Tsebelis, can also have a constitutional basis. Meaning that the 
constitution (in case of the EU the treaties or other sources of EU law) creates such veto 
players in order to block policies. One can deal with this aspect in further deptht if one takes a 
look at how the political game generates veto players. These are called institutional veto 
players. Within such institutionally created veto players, it can be possible that a certain 
majority is needed in order to adopt policies. These necessary majorities are named as partisan 
veto players. Such partisan veto players can appear ad hoc and can use their majority to block 
a new policy issue.169 
After having presented the basic concepts with regards to individual veto players, there 
are also a few other characteristics, which need to be mentioned. The first issue deals with the 
issue of indifference. If there is a new policy issue on which the different political parties need 
to get an agreement, a veto player might be indifferent between two points, but prefers that 
the different parties agree to vote for his ideal point (for a more detailed and graphical 
description consult: Tsebelis, p. 20ff).170 The second aspect is called the winset of the status 
quo. In order to get a deeper understanding of this concept, one needs to imagine a new set of 
policies which can replace the status quo (if there are majority votes for this). However, if the 
beneficial effects of the winset of the new policies are smaller than the winset of the present’s 
status quo, the veto player will stick to maintaining the old status quo.171 Another aspect in 
relation to changing the status quo is the effect of transaction costs. Such costs, as per 
Tsebelis, can prohibit the change of the status quo.  
  
 
 
 
                                                 
169 Tsebelis (2002) p. 19 
170 Ibid. p. 20 
171 Ibid. p. 21 
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5.3 Social constructivism 
 
5.3.1 Social Learning  
  
To begin with this section it is relevant to bring back the relevance of social constructivism 
which will be used to address the first hypothesis: “The EU is able to learn from previous 
cases of democratic backsliding.” Coming back to the empirical section, it is possible to say 
that the EU is able to learn from previous “cases”. The ways in which the EU has learnt from 
the case of Austria, will be picked up in the following analytical chapter. This concept of 
learning and how an institution, as the EU, is able to learn is addressed in the presented notion 
of social constructivism. Furthermore, the concepts regarding identity are also relevant with 
regards to understanding the reasons for the change in Article 7. Risse talks about the 
European identity and his concepts can be used in order to analyse statements for politicians.  
As already mentioned in the introduction to this theory chapter, social constructivist 
outperforms rational choice theories in the fields of social learning and the spread of 
normative values.172 
As per Checkel “…constructivism – at least the modernist branch of concern here – is 
an argument about institutions, one which builds upon the insights of sociological 
institutionalism. It is thus well suited, in a conceptual sense, for expanding our repertoire of 
institutional frameworks for explaining European integration."173 Given the fact that 
constructivist theories are suited to explore many areas in EU studies, the areas of learning 
and socialization will be highlighted.  
At first Checkel defines social learning as a process in which actors, via interaction in 
the wider day to day work of their institution, gain new interests and preferences. The 
awareness for new issues and preferences are created, without being oriented towards material 
motivation. This approach stands in contrast to previous views of agent theories, in which the 
agent was also seen to be able to acquire new information and change policy approaches, 
however in this view the interests remain the same. The following bullet points describe the 
settings under which social learning takes place:  
  
“1) Social learning is more likely in groups where individuals share common professional 
backgrounds – for example, where all/most group members are lawyers or, say, European 
central bankers. 
                                                 
172 Checkel (1999) p. 4 
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2) Social learning is more likely where the group feels itself in a crisis or is faced with clear 
and incontrovertible evidence of policy failure. 
3) Social learning is more likely where a group meets repeatedly and there is high density of 
interaction among participants. 
4) Social learning is more likely when a group is insulated from direct political pressure and 
exposure.”174  
 
In addition to the just mentioned points, Checkel poses questions, in order to get a further 
elaboration. He asks for example, when is a crisis seen as a crisis? A priori or post-hoc? Or: 
When is there enough participant interaction to change their behaviour from strategic 
cooperation to interactive learning?  In order to address the settings more specifically under 
which social learning occurs Checkel presents three further aspects:  
 
“1) when they are in a novel and uncertain environment and thus cognitively motivated to 
analyse new information; 
2) when the persuader is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the 
persuadee belongs or wants to belong; and 
3) when the agent has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the 
persuader’s message.“175  
 
Checkel admits that this work is not fully satisfying. For example he raises: What are 
uncertain environments?; How can one understand integrate political context? Regarding the 
later aspect, Checkel assumes that change is more likely to happen in very narrow isolated 
conditions. In order to be able to carry out research on the above mentioned hypothesis, 
Checkel mentions that it is essential to do a lot of empirical work. This includes access to 
informal meeting protocols or diaries of participants.176  
There exists another aspect which needs further attention: In which form is the construction of 
European norms and values taking place? Checkel presents three features.  
1) Individual agency: Certain individual actors which have a powerful position in the 
policy process have the power to spread their beliefs toward the broader political 
audience. The academic literature refers to these individual actors as moral 
entrepreneurs who strive to convince other actors.  
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2) It is a characteristic of such actors to turn their individual values into broader 
normative beliefs. The best opportunity for doing so is when a policy window opens. 
In brief, such a policy window opens if a group of actors faces a difficult situation in 
which at first hand, there is no simple way forward.  
3) The processes of social learning and socialisation, as done by the just mentioned 
powerful actors, are essential for the promotion of norms at a higher level. However, if 
these actors disappear from the political scene, it might also be possible that their ideas 
disappear with them too. Therefore it is important, in order to promote new norms and 
values, that these actors not only possess a policy window, but also persistence and 
temporal presence.177 
 
5.3.2 The view of a European identity as per Thomas Risse  
 
As already mentioned, this last section is going to focus in short on social constructivism and 
its impact on European identity. In order to categorise social constructivism, this branch of 
theory got into the studies of EU politics as a “spill over” from International Relations 
theories.178  
 
There is no clear perception in the literature regarding the nature of European identity.  
Recent work has shown, that multiple identities exist in Europe (for further information 
consult: Risse (2004) Social Constructivism and European Integration).179 There is however a 
distinction between European and EU identity. Under the umbrella of EU identity falls the 
concept of civic identity. Under this post national identity, it is understood that EU, in the 
Habermasian sense, is identified with promoting democracy, protecting human rights, free 
market economy and cultural diversity. Only states which fulfil these basic criterias (= 
Copenhagen critereas) are able to join the Union.180  
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6 Analysis 
 
 
6.1 Testing of the first hypothesis 
 
To begin with the first hypothesis:”The EU is able to learn from previous cases of democratic 
backsliding”, at first the case of Austria will be looked at. Thereafter, the learning processes 
with regards to the creation of the CVM and reference towards European identity will be 
made. In order to begin, the contribution from Checkel will be applied to the case of Austria, 
briefly followed by Risses contribution. This hypothesis serves as a signpost, regarding the 
time dimension of the EU´s response towards democratic backsliding.  
 
To start, Checkel mentions that the formation of new preferences is created without that these 
are directly a result of material motivated interests. At first, this can be confirmed by looking 
at Sedelmeier, Mudde and Merlingen (2001) who write that there were no material incentives 
at work while the EU-14 agreed to sanction Austria.181 This view is reflected in the 
development of Article 7. As has already been mentioned, the main focus in answering the 
first hypothesis is to uncover the reasons for establishing Article 7 therefore this section has to 
focus mainly on this Article. Already in its initial form, this article was seen as a tool to 
strengthen the European legal framework towards the upcoming 2004 enlargement and to deal 
with possible undemocratic behaviour by Member States (Council meeting 1994). This was 
the initial framework of Article 7.182 
   Yet, the present form of Article 7 came with the case of Austria. As already mentioned in 
the background chapter, due to the Austrian case, Article 7 has been further modified. To 
present the main “weakness” of Article 7 it is necessary to refer back to the version of Article 
7 in the Amsterdam Treaty. To understand why change was implemented it is important to 
carve out the weakness of the old (Amsterdam) Article 7. In the wording of that treaty it was 
referred in Article 7(1), that the European Institutions (such as the EP or the Commission), 
might be able to agree on breach of EU laws as per Article 6(1).183 However, this article 
“simply” states that “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to 
the Member States.”184 Nevertheless, as per the report of the “Three Wise Men”, such a 
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violation of basic EU law has not been taken place and therefore Article 7 had no legal basis 
in order to be applied. As per the Amsterdam Treaty, legal action would only be possible if 
something had actually happened.185 As has just been shown, the main weakness (at least as 
per the EU-MS) which had to be improved was the way in which Article 7 could be used. As 
a consequence of this weakness to apply Article 7, the EU-14 MS agreed to have the bilateral 
sanctions. These measures however, are the result of an ad-hoc decision that was made by the 
EU-14.186  
In order to end situation, it was the idea of the Portuguese President of the Council, 
who came up with the idea of assigning the “Three Wise Men”. Regarding the research 
hypothesis, this step will not be discussed any further, because it does not directly fit 
regarding the hypothesis. To recall, the hypothesis is concerned with the ability of the EU to 
previous learn from previous cases of democratic backsliding and the manifestation of the 
learning process in tangible new laws and instruments or institutions. The instalment of the 
wise men can be seen as a rather provisional ad hoc measure in order to move forward in the 
Austrian case. There is no evidence, that the instalment of such a committee is something of a 
long term institution.187 For this reason, the mandate given towards the wise men cannot be 
seen as a tool. Nevertheless the wise men can be seen as a response from the side of the EU-
14 against Austria.  
To recall the theoretical concept of the policy-window, it is clearly possible to see that such a 
policy window, and along with this the possibility for change/improvement, has been given 
with the case of Austria. This event triggered the modification of Article 7.188  
 
6.1.1 Development of Article 7  
 
In their conclusion of this report, the wise men advised the EU, that preventive and 
monitoring mechanisms need to be integrated into Article 7 so that similar cases can be dealt 
with from the beginning within the EU and the relevant institutions. In addition, having such a 
measure would allow the EU to get directly into an open conversation with the accused MS 
and tensions, which have occurred between Austria and the other 14-MS would be avoided in 
future.   
    The later version of Article 7 reflects the input given by the wise men`s report. The 
report mentioned, for example, that the EU should get in dialogue with the accused MS.189 
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This suggestion is reflected in the Nice Version of Article 7. The origins of Article 7 date 
back to the treaty of Amsterdam (1997). In negotiations and Inter-Governmental Conferences 
it had become apparent that the legal framework of the EU had to be changed with regards to 
the upcoming Eastern Enlargement (2004). In addition, it was also intended that the to be 
adopted sanctioning mechanisms, should decrease the disaffection of the European citizens 
towards the EU.190 As a consequence of the Austrian case (consult here the empirics section), 
Article 7 was strengthened in the Nice Treaty (2003):  
1) With Article 7(1) TEU a new warning mechanism was created so that the Council 
could at first get in contact with the accused state.  
2) A further alteration is that the EP is now placed on the same position with the 
Commission or the EP.  The EP can now send a proposal to the Council and must give 
its okay, before the Council can start with Article 7.  
3) In order to be allowed to take action, the Council now “just” needs a four-fifths 
majority of its members and does now not need to act as per unanimity.  
4) A change in wording has taken place. The Council may “… determine that there 
is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State…” in contrast to the Amsterdam 
Treaty version which states:  “… the existence of a serious and persistent breach by a 
Member State…”.191 
5) The accused state now has the possibility to defend itself. Furthermore, it is now the 
task of the Council to regularly monitor if a breach of EU law (as per Article 6) still 
occurs.  
This Article is still valid until today, there have been no significant changes made in this 
Article in the Lisbon Treaty (2009). 
 
The change in Article 7 is a result of the negotiations which took place in the conferences 
leading up the signature of the Nice Treaty. Different parties such as the EP or the Council 
presented their proposals for the Nice version of Article 7.192 The settings in which change 
occurred are in line with the theoretical contribution regarding social learning. The European 
Institution and the politicians conducting the negotiation of the new Nice treaty (or the ones 
focusing on the wordings of Article 7) can be seen as being in line with Checkels notion of 
individuals who share common professional backgrounds. In this case, the relevant 
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professionals have the same background in politics or are working in political institutions. 
The aspect of high density of interaction, as mentioned in the theory section, is of course 
given in the treaty negotiations. In these negotiations, different proposals by different 
European actors have been presented and discussed. These different proposals will be 
highlighted in the following section. 
 
6.1.2 Influence of other actors 
 
Besides the “wise men”, other actors also had their share in modifying Article 7. The report of 
the wise men was published in September 2000, however already in April 2000 the EP came 
up with a suggestion (EP resolution for the IG Conference) to speed up the procedure for 
activating Article 7. However, the EP did not make a reference in their resolution to the 
Austrian case.193 The next proposal was issued by the Belgium delegation (May 2000) 
concerning the right of initiative by one third of the Member States or by the Commission. 
After Belgium, Austria presented their proposal, which included the right to a fair hearing 
with regards to the accused MS (June 2000). Since Austria has seen itself as being a victim of 
the EU-14 sanctions, it expressed its proposal as a response towards the case. As per the 
Austrian proposal, a European reaction should only take place if there is an objectively 
demonstrable risk of a breach as per Article 6(1). In an analysis of such a proposal, the 
developments in the Austrian Haider case could have most likely not been able to reach the 
EU-level sanctioning mechanisms.194  
The modifications regarding Article 7 were also discussed at the European Council 
meeting (June 2000, Feira). At this meeting the Portuguese president also presented his view 
stating that among other things, the right of initiation should be with the Commission or one 
third of the MS. In contrast to previous recommendations, the Council should act with almost 
close unanimity (nine-tenth of its members). In October 2000, the Commission adopted a 
communication allowing to make changes to Article 7. Finally, the Commission presented a 
procedure that was “… a compromise between the unanimity system proposed by Austria, 
quasi-unanimity proposed by the Portuguese Presidency, and the qualified majority suggested 
by Belgium.”195 So far, the theoretical concepts with regards to common professionals and 
learning by repeated interaction are applicable to the pre-treaty and inter governmental 
conferences leading up to the Nice Treaty. It is also obvious, that the changes towards the 
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Amsterdam version of Article 7 are not all inspired by the report of the three wise men 
(published in September 2000). Yet comparing the presented improvements by the report with 
the above mentioned improvements (from the EP, Belgium and Austria), it is interesting to 
observe that there is overlap. To recall in their suggestions the wise men suggest to introduce 
preventive and monitoring mechanisms in order to get in time into dialogue with the accused 
MS(§ 117). In line with the theory, the European actors regarding the case of Austria, were in 
a new situation which was outside of the scope of the normal legal framework and 
mechanisms. Therefore, the analysis of this new situation by the European actors (EP and 
MS) and the resulting suggestions to improve the present situation can be seen as a motivation 
to improve the situation.  
 
However, it has been presented that the EU (institutions as well as the MS) were able to learn 
from the Austrian case and changed the Article 7. This view is also confirmed by Hummer, 
who concludes that the Commission “… together with the three Member State proposals cited 
above and with which the Conference will be “…drawing its consequences from the Austrian 
affair” and proposing the institutionalisation of prevent political dialogue. “196  
 
6.1.3 Further evidence that learning has taken place 
 
To begin this section, the concept of difficult situation will be picked up. In the case of 
Austria, it is with reference to the presented Background section possible to say that the EU 
faced a very difficult situation.197 To give further illustration to this statement, Israel and the 
United States expressed their concern with regards to the happenings in Austria.198 Also 
within the EU, the Haider case caused a lot of concern.199 "It's too simplistic to say we must 
keep Austria in Europe at all costs," argued the Belgian foreign minister, Louis Michel. 
"Europe can very well do without Austria.  We don't need it."200 Therefore, it is reasonable to 
see this as a difficult situation (in line with the theory). This difficult situation can also be 
addressed as being a crisis which the EU has to face and which triggered the improvement of 
Article 7.  
 
The report of the wise men, who suggested having a preventive and monitoring procedure 
inbuilt in Article 7, can be reflected in the present Article 7. This reflects the powerful 
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position in which the Three Wise Men were and also shows that they can be seen as moral 
entrepreneurs. In the academic literature, there is lots of reference, that the case of Austria 
influenced the modification of Article 7 in the Nice treaty. Sadurski concludes that “…the 
“Haider affair” was an immediate trigger of the enhancement of Article 7 mechanism in 
Nice…”.201 This can be seen confirmed in another quote by the then French Commissioner 
Michel Barnier who mentioned in the EP (April 2000), that “… it is sometimes necessary to 
state the obvious, for all the current Member States, and all those, which are preparing to join 
the Union. Because democracy and respect for citizens’ rights must never be taken for 
granted, but fought for and defended…”.202 In his speech, Barnier does not directly refer to 
the Austrian case, however there are two pieces of evidence why it is likely that his speech 
has been motivated as a consequence of the Austrian case.203 At first, he it needs to be 
mentioned that he was “…a prominent member of the RPR, a political party led by President 
Jacques Chirac, who was one of the most fervent supporters of the sanctions against 
Austria.204 Sadurski himself adds that Barnier has been a strong supporter towards sanctioning 
Austria. Also, as can be seen by the date of his speech, it is likely to assume that he was 
influenced by the just two months before happening sanctioning of Austria. In relation to this, 
Commissioner Barnier mentions in a speech (October 2000) in which he refers to the above 
quoted speech that it would be useful to add a preventive mechanism to Article 7: “This 
Article currently makes it possible only to penalise collectively violations of fundamental 
rights, but does not permit collective action to prevent such violations. I firmly believe that 
the Member States of the Union should collectively be given the means to engage in a 
preventive political dialogue."205 This can be seen as evidence, that Barnier drew his lessons 
from the problematic case with Austria and promoted the mechanism of a preventive 
dialogue. This was not possible with Austria. Furthermore, he might also be seen therefore as 
a moral entrepreneur. 
 
Adding to the work of Sadurski, de Burca reaches the same conclusion. As per de Burca, the 
EU drew two key lessons from the Austrian case. 
1) Measures to protect core EU values need to be implemented not just with focus on 
future enlargements 
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2) The existing way in which Article 7 can be used needs further improvement in order to 
be able to be effectively used in future cases.206  
Furthermore, the crisis with Austria highlighted the weaknesses of the present Article 7 
mechanisms. “Learning from this situation, the Nice Treaty added a preventive mechanism to 
the above-mentioned provisions of Article 7, to address cases in which there is a “clear risk of 
a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2″, without the breach 
itself being explicitly established (Article 7.1 TEU).”207 The modification of the Article 7 
made it much easier to reach such a conclusion compared to the old working of Article 7 (as 
per the Amsterdam treaty).    
 
6.1.4 The case of Austria as per the view of European identity   
 
With regards to the just presented section, it is also relevant to look at the contributions from 
Risse. His concepts will help to further understand the reasons for the actions of the EU 
towards the improvement of Article 7. Looking at the motivation behind the EU to improve 
Article 7 can be better understood by using Risse´s contribution. Looking at his contributions, 
there is evidence to see the actions taken by the EU-14 to be motivated by Risse´s concept of 
European Identity. Sedelmeier, Mudde and Merlingen mention that the issue of protecting 
democracy and human rights already dates back to the 1960s, by being emphasized by the 
ECJ. Besides other declarations which have been signed during the past decades, the 
upcoming 2004 enlargement re-enforced the idea that it is the task of the EU to promote 
human rights and democratic values. This counts for internal and external affairs.208 Therefore 
the sanctions against Austria were motivated by the perception that Austria did not act within 
the realm of European norms and values.209 This can be confirmed by following statements: 
 
“… the Portuguese Prime Minister, Antonio Guterres, insisted that the EU was 'a 
Union based on a set of values and rules and on a common civilisation' (Agence 
Europe, 29.1.2000) and described the FPO as a 'party which does not abide by the 
essential values of the European family' (Guardian, 1.2.2000). British Foreign 
Secretary Robin Cook said that the 'naked appeal to xenophobia on which Mr. Haider 
has based his platform ... is something that strikes against the basis of the European 
Union' (Europe, March 2000). The German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroder, justified 
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the opposition of the EU-14 to the inclusion of the FPO in the Austrian government as 
'an expression that we stand for a Europe based on shared values [that] Mr Haider has 
constantly violated' (Guardian, 10.2.2000). And the Italian Prime Minister, Massimo 
D'Alema, emphasized that 'Europe has certain criteria and values that unite it. If these 
are thrown into question, Europe has a right to speak its mind' (Guardian, 1.2. 
2000).”210 Similar views have been expressed by the Commission and the EP.211  
 
This states that the sanctions against Austria can be linked to the European understanding of 
being democratic. However, one cannot fully confirm that the response towards Austria was 
only backed up by the European Identity of the EU. As per Börzel, it remains until today “… 
controversial whether European governments were driven by a concern for the future of 
democracy and human rights, owing to a specific European sensitivity (Bogdandy 2000: 
1318), or whether they were driven by the “self-interest of power hungry politicians” 
(Merlingen et al. 2001: 61)… .”212 Sedelmeier, Mudde and Merlingen conclude in their article, 
that besides the just described values of identity politics also actors within the state were 
responsible had their share in pushing forward with the sanctions.213 Yet, with regards to the 
delimitation section, this project is mainly concerned to test the hypothesis given the 
theoretical framework. The possible influence of domestic actors with regards to the Austrian 
case is a topic for further research, consult here for the Afterthoughts section.  
All in all, Checkels contribution is sufficient enough to explain, via the tools of social learning, 
why the EU improved Article 7 and that the EU drew its lessons from the Austrian case. 
Risse´s contributions have helped to better understand that besides learning, the motivation of 
the European actors results from their highly valued democratic background.   
 
6.1.5 Cooperation and Verification Mechanism  
 
As stated in the introduction, with regards to the just presented Analysis, it is also interesting 
to look, if the implementation of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) can 
also be understood as a response of the Austrian case. It is relevant to look at this tool, since 
the EU is successfully using this mechanism to improve the democratic backsliding in 
Romania. At first it seems to be logical, that the same measures which have led to the 
changing of Article 7 would also apply to the implementation of CVM. However, the 
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literature does not present any evidence that the creation of the CVM has been done as a 
consequence of the Austrian case. The CV Mechanism has been implemented with the 
enlargement towards Romania and Bulgaria (2007) because both countries were lacking, for 
example in aspects such as rule of law reforms or in corruption control. Therefore it is with 
the CVM intended that these two countries maintain their pre-accession reform momentum.214 
It would be possible to apply the theoretical framework form Checkel to understand if the 
implementation of the CV Mechanisms was due to a learning process of the Austrian case. 
Yet, the analysis of the available EU documents only refer that CV Mechanism was set up in 
response to the lagging progress in the fields of governance and judicial day to day work.215 
The Commission Decision, in which the CVM was created (December 2006), mentions for 
example in the case of Romania, that improvements still need to be made “…in the 
accountability and efficiency of the judicial system and law enforcement bodies, where 
further progress is still necessary to ensure their capacity to implement and apply the 
measures adopted to establish the internal market and the area of freedom, security and 
justice.”216 The wording in the Commission decision for Bulgaria emphasises similar 
aspects.217 The presented documents do not link the CVM to any case of protection of 
democracy. In relation to this, one would not expect that the Commission publicly criticises a 
MS or refer to a MS in a negative way. Yet, also the academic literature does not draw a link 
between the establishment of the CVM and the case of Austria.218 It is also mentioned that if 
withholding the EU membership, it was feared by the Commission that Bulgaria and Romania 
might slow down the reform progress due to frustration with the EU accession process. The 
EU granted “…full membership to Bulgaria and Romania was hence to some extent “… a 
reflection of wider security imperatives which led the EU to allow the accession of ‘imperfect’ 
new member states instead of risking the unpredictable costs of their exclusion.”219 In 
connection to this, there is no real link between having a right wing extremist party in 
government and the cases of Romania and Bulgaria in which the issues were mainly about 
less “dramatic” issues.  
Therefore, it is possible to say, that the documents examined do not indicate that the 
implementation of the CVM is not a learning consequence of the Austrian case. Since there is 
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no evidence that the implementation of these mechanisms has been a result of learning from 
the Austrian case, this paper, with focus on the research hypothesis number one will not 
further investigate into this branch. However, there might be the possibility that the EU has 
drawn its lessons from difficulties of the 2004 (EU-10) enlargement. This is a topic suitable 
for further research, since this question is out of this papers academic focus.  
 
Moreover, the 2007 established Fundamental Rights Agency, which is a successor of the 2002 
created EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights (FRA), can also be seen 
as a consequence of the Austrian case.220 However, it will not be examined if the concepts of 
learning, as presented in the theory chapter, can be linked to FRA because this agency is not 
as important as Article 7. The FRA has a rather observatory task, whereas in contrast Article 7 
is the first development in the case of tackling democratic backsliding and it is the most 
powerful tool. It can be up for future research to investigate if the FRA is a consequence of 
the EU´s ability to learn and if lessons drawn from the Austrian case can be applied to the 
FRA.  
 
6.2 Testing of the second hypothesis  
 
To recall the second hypothesis: There are different configurations of veto players for 
different cases. This hypothesis will be answered by using the theoretical contributions from 
Tsebelis who focuses on institutionalised veto players. This approach is interesting to take 
because he looks institutionally generated veto players which are part of the political game. 
Looking at the case of Austria, the sanctions were done outside the framework of the EU 
since there was no breach of the back then Article 7. As a result, neither the Council not the 
European Parliament could take initiative. Therefore the 14-MS acted bilaterally (meaning 
fourteen independent decisions).221 For that reason it is not possible to use Tsebelis 
contribution. In regards to this, as can be seen from the empirics section, the case of Romania 
was settled relatively quickly without that the framework of Article 7 had to be initiated. As 
mentioned, the Commission acts as an institutional veto player, because it is only the 
Commission which initiates action against Bucharest. The tools used by the Commission are 
in line with the constitutional powers, to be more precise the CVM legislation. Therefore the 
Commission acts as a single veto player. This is an example of how a veto player can 
successfully use its mandate to take initiative. With regards to this, the situation in Hungary 
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was different. Here, it is possible to say that the EPP can be seen as a partisan veto player, 
because this veto player is generated by the political game, thus the difficulty of getting a 
necessary majority in the European Parliament to issue Article 7. Keeping Tsebelis 
contribution in mind, it is possible to say that the EPP is a single actor, active one level below 
the Commission, namely in the decision making process within the EP.222 Since the case of 
Romania could be resolved successfully, with regards to democratic backsliding, the case of 
the EPP remains to be analysed. For that reason the following section examines the case of the 
European Parliament and the voting behaviour of the EPP.  
Besides this aspect, it is also interesting to look at the EP because it is the only directly 
elected institution of the EU and responsible to represent the will of the European citizens.223 
Also, the project of this research is democracy and therefore it fits to look at this institution 
and not at the other MS, the Council or the Commission. The aspect of leaving out the last 
three mentioned institutions will be discussed in the Afterthoughts section.   
 
The analysis of this hypothesis takes its point of departure from the findings from Sedelmeier. 
To quickly recall his findings, he analyses, that the conditions for the use of social pressure 
were much more likely to meet with success in Romania, than in Hungary.224 Furthermore, as 
per his findings, the EU tends to be more successful in tackling democratic backsliding if 
conditions are existing  to use social and material pressure.225 Keeping his contribution in 
mind, this sub-section is focusing on using the contributions from Tsebelis in order to use his 
notion of veto players to better understand the actions of the EPP. In contrast to Sedelmeier, 
Tsebelis is useful because his contribution directly focus on veto players and how these 
players pursue their interests. By taking this approach, this section adds new findings towards 
the understanding of the EPP´s behaviour. In addition, Hungary was the only case in which 
there would have been a possibility to use Article 7. The Austrian case, as has been discussed, 
has not been “severe” enough so that the old version of Article 7 (Amsterdam treaty) could be 
applied. In contrast to this, there was no need to consider using Article 7 in the case of 
Romania, because the Ponta government followed relatively quickly the pressure exerted 
from the European Commission.226  
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        6.2.1 European Parliaments first resolution (July 2011)  
 
To begin with, there has been until now (Feb. 2015) no formal proposal within the EP on 
order to activate Article 7. Yet, there have been two resolutions in which the situation of 
Hungary has been discussed in the European Parliament. In these resolutions, the EP 
expressed the concern of the MEPs with regards to the situation in Hungary.227 Being 
chronological, the first resolution was issued on the 5th July 2011, being preceded by a debate 
in the EP about the situation in Hungary with regards to the changes of the constitution. It is 
noteworthy, that all parties represented in the EP presented their concern regarding the new 
Hungarian constitution, except for the EEP (for further information consult the Parliament 
Debate from the 8th of June 2011).228 The final resolution was adopted at the 5th of July 2011 
following up on the just mentioned EP debate. In this resolution, the EP asked the government 
in Hungary to address the below mentioned issues: 
“      -   actively seek consensus, to ensure greater transparency and to foster genuine political 
and social inclusion and a broad public debate in connection with the forthcoming 
drafting and adoption of the cardinal laws laid down in the new Constitution; 
- adopt only the basic and clearly defined scope of cardinal laws regulating the tax and 
pension systems, family policies and cultural, religious and socio-economic policies, 
allowing future governments and democratically elected legislatures to take 
autonomous decisions on these policies; revise the current mandate of the Budget 
Council; 
- guarantee equal protection of the rights of every citizen, no matter which religious, 
sexual, ethnic or other societal group they belong to, in accordance with Article 21 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in the Constitution and its preamble; 
- explicitly guarantee in the Constitution, including its preamble, that Hungary will 
respect the territorial integrity of other countries when seeking the support of ethnic 
Hungarians living abroad; 
- reaffirm the independence of the judiciary by restoring the right of the Constitutional 
Court to review budget-related legislation without exception, as required by ECHR-
based law, by revising the provision on the lower mandatory retirement age for judges 
and by guaranteeing explicitly the independent management of the judicial system; 
- explicitly protect in the new Constitution all fundamental civil and social rights in line 
with Hungary's international obligations, ban the death penalty, life imprisonment 
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without parole and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, provide sufficient 
guarantees concerning the protection of fundamental rights, and make it clear that 
fundamental rights are acquired at birth and are unconditional” to mention the most 
important recommendations.229  
It is interesting to mention that this resolution was supported by the following parties: S&D, 
GUE/NGL, Greens/EFA and ALDE groups. Besides the EPP the ECR (European 
Conservatives and Reformists Group), the EFD (Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group) 
and the NI (Non-attached) did not support the resolution. The main focus will be on the 
actions of the EPP because Orban´s ruling party is affiliated to the EPP.230 In addition, it is 
possible and also logical to assume that the EPP has a “personal” interest to support Orban 
and therefore does not follow the other European parties. The reasons for the support of 
Orban by the other European parties such as by the ECR (European Conservatives and 
Reformists Group), EFD (Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group) and NI (Non-attached) 
might be due to party alliances, but this is out of the focus of this hypothesis. Furthermore, the 
case of the EPP asks for the application of Tsebelis theoretical contribution (this will be done 
later in this section). The support by the EPP, with regards to the 2011 adopted resolution, is 
carried out by party members from different countries: 
“"There is a great deal of political motivation behind this debate," argued MEP Simon 
Busuttil (EPP; Malta); Kinga Gál (EPP; Hungary) blasted the "collective hysteria" among 
political opponents regarding the law; Manfred Weber (EPP; Germany), suggested that the 
Commission should examine the media laws of all 27 member states and not just 
Hungary.”  This quote is meant to show, that the support towards the EPP is not only coming 
from Hungarian members of the EPP, but is based across all EPP party members.  
 
6.2.2 Second resolution issued by the European Parliament in 2012  
 
The next time in which the EPP took a stand supporting Orban was in 2012, when the EP 
adopted a new text following up on the resolution from July 2011. The resolution, which has 
been supported by the same groups as the one from July 2011 starts with, that these groups 
“…express serious concern at the situation in Hungary in relation to the exercise of 
democracy, the rule of law, the respect and protection of human and social rights, the system 
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of checks and balances, equality and non-discrimination.”231 The issues listed, are similar to 
the previously adopted text and address the occurring democratic backsliding within Hungary 
(consult EP´s adoption: 2012/2511(RSP). The alarming report concludes with an openly 
expressed call towards the European Commission and the Council of Europe to monitor the 
situation in Hungary. In addition, the EP is considering if the Hungarian situation asks for the 
start of the Article 7 procedures.232  
 
6.2.3 The report from Rui Tavares (June 2013)  
 
The latest development in this case, is the adoption of the 2012/2130(INI) text which is a 
follow up resolution to the EP´s resolution from February 2012. Previous to this report, the   
Rapporteur Tavares has published its report in which he criticised the present undemocratic 
situation in Hungary (consult the Empirics section). Like the other resolutions, this one has 
been subject to discussion in Parliament, however the EPP and the other supporting parties of 
the EPP (as have been already mentioned) were not in line with the other parties (who 
adopted the resolution in Feb 2012). The EPP rejected the report because it is seen as an 
attempt by the European left wing parties to force their will upon the Hungarian government. 
Furthermore, as per the EPP, it is not the task of the EP to “…tell people how they have to 
live.”233 
Different EPP (or also called PPE) party members defended Hungary´s democratic 
principles. MEP´s who have been defending Hungary were: Protasiewicz Jacek, Manfred 
Weber and, Lívia Járóka. The MEP György Schöpflin for example mentioned that, the 
Tavares report  
“… amounts to a direct attack on the credibility of each and every Member State. 
Further, the Tavares report in effect seeks to impose a new Constitution on Hungary. 
Does the left seriously think that Hungarian society can identify with a Basic Law 
written in Brussels or by the Venice Commission? Then, why pick on Hungary? Are 
you singling out Hungary because it is small? Because to us what is going on looks 
very like post-colonial bullying. Are there not other Member States where the status of 
human rights may actually be worse than in Hungary? Are you not applying a double 
standard? Finally, are you aware of the unintended consequences of what you are 
doing? Hungary-bashing may be agreeable, but it has had the effect of de-
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Europeanising Hungary and strengthening support for Jobbik and Euroscepticism. Is 
this what you want to achieve?“234 
 
6.2.4 European Parliament resolution from July 2013 
  
In July the EP passed its latest resolution on the Hungarian case. However, with this 
discussion the case of Hungary has not yet been closed. The last discussion in the EP took 
place in October 2014.235 With regards to the just mentioned resolution, the following has 
been agreed on: 
“    -     Reforms in Hungary 
- The Fundamental Law and its Transitional Provisions 
- Extensive use of cardinal laws 
- Weakening of checks and balances 
- Media legislation (to mention the most important aspects)”236 
Besides “obligatory” recommendations to the Hungarian government, the report also 
recommends that the EU institutions, have to improve the “… so-called ‘Copenhagen 
dilemma’, whereby the EU remains very strict with regard to compliance with the common 
values and standards on the part of candidate countries but lacks effective monitoring and 
sanctioning tools once they have joined the EU.”237 
This has been the last possibility for the EP to start Article 7 proceedings. It needs to 
be recalled, that as per the wording of the Amsterdam treaty the EP, among other actors, 
needs to give its assent towards the Council so that Article 7 can start. The EP has shown its 
willingness to start Article 7, but without the support by the EPP this will not happen.238 As 
per Article 354 of the TFEU an assent within the EP is reached if an absolute majority (= a 
two thirds majority) has to be reached, and this is without the support of the EPP not 
possible.239 The EPPs reluctance to align with the other parties is also mentioned in the 
Journal: Common Market Law Review.240  
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6.2.5 Reference to Tsebelis contributions   
 
After having established, that the EPP can be seen as a veto player and during which 
occasions the EPP was active, it becomes relevant now to use Tsebelis contribution to better 
understand the reasons for the EPPs activity.  
It has been shown, that the EPP clearly promotes its own policies and it is possible to 
say that the situation in Hungary is not in line with basic EU laws. Furthermore, it is only the 
EPP (along with its political allies in the Parliament) which is still protecting the Hungarian 
government. As has been mentioned, Viktor Orban is the vice president of the EPP and this 
might be an explanation for why the party has been so much in his support.241 Also, due to the 
formalities of Article 7, it is necessary that the EPP has to agree. Given its size, the party has a 
very powerful position and even if all the other parties in the EP would align, the necessary 
majority of two thirds cannot be reached without the support of the EPP. In this case, it is 
possible to say, that the powers of the EPP have been created by the political system (here 
Article 7 mechanisms). In addition,  the power of the EPP relies in the relatively large share of 
seats the party gained during the 2009 elections. In relation to this, the EPP can be seen as an 
ad hoc appearing veto player and therefore also fits to Tsebelis concept of partisan veto 
players. The EPP is acting within the EP (which can be seen as per Tsebelis as an institutional 
veto player) as a partisan veto player (using its majority to bloc policies/Article 7). Relevant 
to the case of the EPP is Tsebelis aspect of indifference. Having the above presented latest 
discussions in mind (before the EPs resolutions in Feb 2012 and July 2013), it was the 
standpoint from the EPPs members that the situation in Hungary is going well and that the EU 
should not interfere. There has never been a vote in the EP, whether there should be a vote 
activating Article 7 or not. Yet, the concept can be linked to the wordings of the EP´s 
resolutions. In all text adopted, the EP mainly continues to criticise the situation in Hungary 
without that actual sanctions follow. It is therefore likely to assume that the wordings of the 
resolutions are close to the EPPs preferences. Since Article 7 has not yet been activated it is 
clearly visible, that the winset of the present outcome and thus remaining with the old status 
quo is very high for the EPP.  
 
6.3 Testing of the third hypothesis 
 
To recall the third hypothesis: The legal relationship between the EU and each of the analysed 
Member States (Austria, Romania and Hungary) is different and this difference affects the 
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response of the EU towards each case. To start with this part, it is necessary to mention that 
the relationship between the EU and Austria and Hungary has been different compared to the 
relationship between the EU and Romania. The former two countries are full members and 
have the same rights as the other 26 MS. However, as already mentioned Romania is different 
because this country is still a member to the CVM mechanism and has a special relationship 
with the EU. Therefore the different legal relationship that exists between the EU and the 
three cases gives the EU different tools at hand. In addition, the hypothesis is concerned with 
legal relationships and therefore this section mainly looks at the Commission and its way 
forward. The rational choice focus has been chosen because the presented concepts help to 
understand the behaviour of the involved actors. It is assumed, that both parties (the EU and 
Romania) want to improve the present situation and are therefore acting in a rational way.   
 
 6.3.1 The actions of the Commission  
 
The main focus in this section is on the European Union. Therefore, it is at first relevant to 
look at the EU to better understand the motives the EU has so that Romania complies with the 
EU law. Following this, a few lines will be presented with regards to the underlying reasons 
for Romania’s motives to comply.  
   The behaviour of the Commission (who was mainly responsible in solving the conflict with 
Romania) has a clear set of preferences. These are to improve the governance by emergence 
degrees and to bring back to rule of law. This can be seen by the following quote from the 
Commission: “The Commission is…extremely concerned by the indications of manipulations 
and pressure which affect institutions, members of the judiciary, and eventually have a serious 
impact on society as a whole.”242 The Commission took therefore upon itself a new task, that 
of  “…help[ing to] restore respect for principles which are cornerstones of European 
democracy”.243 Also the way in which the Commission tried to solve the crisis with Romania 
is done very strategically. It was not proposed by the Commission to use Article 7. As can be 
seen from the previously done presentation of Article 7 (consult Empirics section), the 
application of this Article is very complex and requires the activation of at least two European 
institution. In addition, Article 7 just refers to “…a clear risk of a serious breach by a MS of 
the values referred to in Article 2”. This definition is very vague and difficult to prove. This 
might be an explanation, why Article 7 has not yet been used.244 Therefore it is likely to 
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assume that the Commission used other tools such as social pressure, issue linkage and 
infringement procedures to “force” Romania to cooperate.245 Thus the concepts of strategic 
interaction and a cost-benefit analysis can also be applied to the Commission in following 
their agenda to improve the situation in Romania. “Commissioner Reding, in particular, 
strategically linked the EU’s demands concerning respect for the rule of law and the 
referendum participation quorum to Romania’s Schengen membership.”246 The same is true 
for Commission President Barosso and the implementation of his eleven “commandments”.247  
Regarding the creation of the CVM, to categorise this measure, it can be seen as a 
newly established institution.248 Adding to the previously described and building up on Risses 
concepts, the creation of the CVM can also be seen as an institution to which the actors in the 
Commission agreed because they all had the same belief that democratic control mechanism 
in the EU are not as well developed as they should be.  
 
6.3.2 The European Commission’s Schengen link  
 
In order to get a deeper understanding of the “Schengen agreement” it is possible to consult 
Garrett and Weingasts notion of a constructed focal point. To begin with, besides the 
Commission, also the MS pressured that Romania had to improve its rule of law, before being 
given accession to the Schengen area. “…Romania had yet to meet the Schengen political 
criteria, given the Member States’ decision to condition Schengen accession by respect for the 
rule of law (Cusnir, 2013), aspects of which are covered by the CVM.”249 Member States such 
as France, Germany, the Netherlands and Finland were blocking Romanias accession to the 
Schengen area.250 Here the actors could have chosen between letting Romania join the 
Schengen area or postponing the accession towards Schengen until the democratic backsliding 
is resolved. Yet there is evidence for the later point, indicating that besides the Commission 
the MS had an interest to have a democratic functioning member entering the EU.  
"The fundamental principles of democracy, the rule of law and constitutional division of 
powers cannot be ignored," German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle told the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung on Sunday in reference to Romania. He pledged that Berlin "will not 
ignore" developments in the country and added: "Serious violations of the letter and spirit of 
European values would raise questions about Romania's readiness to take the last steps toward 
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full integration into the European Union”.251 Finally, it is definitely possible to state that the 
Commission was successful in tackling the situation of democratic backsliding in Romania. 
The focus here in this analysis is mainly with regards to the accomplishment towards 
Barrosos commandments. However, present studies cannot show if the comply towards these 
commandments was a result of Schengen membership or the combined effect of social 
pressure. CVM is seen as a tool belonging of Social pressure, due to the “embarrassing” 
presentations of the countries shortcomings.252  
With regards to the Romanina perspective, it is also possible to use the rational choice 
theory in order get a better understanding this country´s government behaviour. This is 
especially valid for the concepts presented by Hall and Taylor. Besides the EU being rational, 
also Romania acts rational. Complying with the pressure from the EU is beneficial due to the 
access towards the Schengen Area. Being granted to be a member of the Schengen Area is a 
sign of trust form the other MS, that the new country is able to protect the European 
borders.253 Furthermore access to Schengen improves trade and the economy of the newly 
adapted MS.254 For this reason, the relevance of Schengen, and becoming a member of this 
Area can be explained as belonging to fixed set of preferences which are valuable to 
Bucharest. The adaption of the Commissions claims is also a result of a cost-benefit analysis 
done within the government in Romania.  
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7 Conclusions 
 
 
Based on the three analysed With regards to the first hypothesis, it is definitely possible to say, 
that the EU has drawn lessons from the Austrian case. These lessons have been manifested in 
the improvement of Article 7. At first sight, it looks like learning has been taken place, 
because there were no bilateral sanctions regarding the cases of Romania and Hungary. Yet, it 
was not possible to find evidence that the EU-MS were discussing of re-staring bilateral 
sanctions again as an alternative to the “established” tools. It can also be assumed that the 
treatment of Hungary might have been done differently. To recall, the Nice version of Article 
7 established a mechanism in order to get in dialogue with the accused Member State. By 
splitting up the process of taking the voting rights of a MS away, it is easier to start with small 
steps such as diplomatic solutions instead of starting with the accusation of a serious 
breach.255 
 
In fact, the case of Hungary has shown, that the EP was fully aware of the situation in 
Hungary and there was a majority within the EP parties who were in favour of signing a 
resolution towards the activation of Article 7. Yet, the EPP has never been a signing party of 
the EP´s adopted resolution and is also very supportive towards Orban´s regime. Therefore, 
one can say, that veto players in fact are very important for the functioning of the EU´s fight 
against democratic backsliding. The case of the EPP reveals a weakness of the Article 7 
mechanism.   
 
It is also interesting to see, how the way the EU tackles democratic backsliding is influenced 
by the relationship. Comparing the case of Romania with Austria and Hungary, it is at first 
observable that the case of Romania could be dealt with much faster and with fewer 
difficulties. In the case of Austria, the EU itself had no legal stand to initiate action. The 
conflict with Budapest is going on since end of 2010 and is in some cases not yet fully 
solved.256 Latest international criticism from the USA towards Hungary has been expressed in 
October 2014.257 The relationship the EU had with Bucharest made it easier for the 
Commission to pressure Romania into complying with EU requirements. There is evidence to 
see that the withholding of the Schengen membership has had its impact on the Romanian 
                                                 
255 Budó (2014) p. 3f  
256 worldpoliticsreview.com (2014);  eutopialaw.com (2014)    
257 EuObserver.com (2014) “US diplomat lashes out at Hungary's Orban” 
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government. As has been stated, the use of social pressure combined with CVM reports might 
have also had its contribution.  
 
It is interesting with regards to the three presented cases, that each case is similar due to the 
fact that the ruling government has been implementing democratic backsliding. It is with 
regards to Austria not that easy to say if this also constitutes as a form of democratic 
backsliding, yet in 2000 the then 14 MS were in high alert.  The cases are different in regards 
to the details of democratic backsliding and how the surrounding conditions have influenced 
the response of the EU to solve the case. For the three cases it is possible to say, that the EU is 
able to learn from cases of democratic backsliding. However the way the EU responds and the 
effectiveness of the EU´s tools depend on the outer surroundings of each case and if there are 
veto players who have an agenda on their own.   
 
 
7.1 Afterthoughts 
 
In this section will present some further thoughts and reflections on this paper. To begin with 
the tools analysed, it could be interesting to assess the actual effectiveness of these tools. 
Looking at Article 7, even though it was modified, due to partisan voting behaviour, this tool 
could not be used. From the beginning of this research, the EPP has always maintained a 
neutral till supportive position towards Hungary. In addition, is very interesting to look at the 
EPP and their view towards Romania. It was even suggested by the some EPP MEPs to 
activate Article 7.258 In a press release the EPP MEP Elmar Brok said:  
"It is intolerable that the socialist Prime Minister Ponta is putting pressure on the highest court 
and that single judges and their families are being threatened. Mr Ponta is thereby violating 
the principle of an independent judiciary."259 Yet with regards to the first debate about the 
Hungarian constitution (back in 2011) he was much larger: “It is for this reason that I believe 
what we are witnessing here is a bit of political theatre. We do not have the right to interfere 
with the Hungarian constitution. Perhaps I would have done certain things differently, but it is 
Hungary’s right to do things as it sees fit.”260 He could have also said exactly the same for the 
Romanian case, but publically criticised social democrat Ponta. Based on this seemingly 
contradiction, a topic for further research could be to analyze in how far the parties are 
influenced by partisan politics. Similar is true for MEP Joseph Daul (Chairman of the EPP 
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259 European Peoples Party (8.8.20102) “Press Release on Romania”  
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Group, EP) who was very strict with the social democrat Ponta, but also very large with 
Orban.261 Also, in contrast to the findings of the analysis section 6.1.4 (regarding European 
identity) it seems questionable in how far this is valid for all the MEPs. It could also be 
relevant to investigate the commitment to these “European values” while looking at other 
institutions with regards to Article 7. Relating to Hungary, for example, the Council remained 
very silent and this could be a further research topic.    
 
Thinking about a future, similar project it could also be interesting to look at the effectiveness 
of the infringement procedures and analyse which factors influence the functioning of these 
procedures.  Here, the infringement procedures against Hungary, could be compared with 
another similar case not discussed in this paper. Also, it is interesting to notice, that the 
infringement towards Hungary has been done based on violation of the single market and not 
justified by democratic backsliding.  
 
Looking at the theoretical contribution, it could have been also relevant to add the rational 
choice framework to the case of Austria and to compare, which theoretical framework suits 
best to the Austrian case. With regards to the use of social constructivism, given the high 
similarity with sociological institutionalism, a researcher might get curious to study if a 
similar outcome would have been achieved given the same empirical material but using a 
sociological institutionalist theory.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
261 Nine O´Clock.ro (2012) “New EPP criticism”, European Parliament (2013) debate (2nd July 2013)  
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9 Appendix  
 
 
The following E-Mails have been sent out without that any response has been received. Yet, 
given the material available it was nevertheless possible to conduct the Analysis. 
 
 
Dear Ms. Ahrenkilde-Hansen  
 
I am a student from the University of Roskilde, Denmark and I am writing at the moment my 
master thesis about the undemocratic policies in Hungary.  
 
Right now I am doing some background research and I aim to get on full overview of the 
EU´s response to each of Hungary´s anti-democratic policies. I encounter many difficulties as 
there is no real overview about this case. There are many academic articles and newspaper 
articles, but they all just give me a few bits. The last days I have spend looking at all these 
articles in order to get a chronological overview of what has happened. However, besides the 
fact that this work is really taking a lot of time, I am afraid that I might miss out some relevant 
information. 
 
Therefore I would like to ask you, if there is a kind of overview which states all the reactions 
of the EU (including the EP, Commission, the Council and the various other EU agencies).  
I have been looking at the EU´s homepages, but the information is really spread out and I am 
afraid to miss out on important articles.  
 
I hope that you can help me 
Thank you very much in advance for your help 
 
Kind regards, 
Rolf Peter Greve   
 
 
 
 
With regards to this mail, the same mail has been sent to 5 different people working in the 
same department. Since the content of the mail is the same, it is sufficient just to present one 
mail 
 
 
Dear Ms Bourisquot  
 
I am a student from the University of Roskilde and currently writing my Master Thesis. In 
brief, I am looking at the way in which the EU tackles cases of democratic backsliding in the 
Member States. I have a concrete question regarding the following resolutions from the 
European Parliament:  
 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2010/0251
(COD)  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2012/2511
(RSP)  
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http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2012/2130
(INI)  
For each of the three procedure files, I would like to ask you if you could be so kind as so 
forward the data regarding the voting pattern. I am interested to see, within the final votes, 
which MEP (or at least which parliamentary party) voted for which position. Also, in each of 
the three cases, I would like to know, what was the exact issue/or question to which the 
parliament had to vote on.  
 
Taking for example: 2012/2130(INI). I would like to know, what was the exact issue the 
MEPs voted and what who (which party fraction) voted with yes and no. 
It would be very convenient for me, if you could send the material to by the end of this week. 
 
Thank you very much for your help in advance 
Kind regards 
 
Rolf Peter Greve 
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